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Abstract 
What speakers say is sometimes incongruent with the manner in which it is said. As a result, 
listeners are exposed to inconsistencies in communication: for example, when a speaker‟s words 
are discrepant with her demonstrated emotions (e.g., a positive statement said in a negative tone 
of voice). While inconsistencies may be exploited by speakers to produce nuanced 
communication (e.g., verbal irony), they also introduce ambiguity, which may render the speaker 
a less credible source of information. The present work outlines three studies examining the 
extent to which children make credibility discriminations based on the consistency of a speaker‟s 
lexical and non-verbal cues. In Study 1, when children were provided the opportunity to solicit 
novel information from video-recorded speakers, or unknown speakers, school-age children (7- 
and 8- year-olds) preferred to solicit information from consistent speakers to a greater extent than 
inconsistent speakers (e.g., those who provided a negative statement in a positive tone of voice). 
In contrast, preschool-age children (4- and 5- year-olds) did not show a preference for 
consistency and avoided speakers who showed any negative valence (lexical or non-verbal). 
Study 2 demonstrated that school-age children‟s preference for consistent speakers did not 
extend to a context where children had to decide whether to solicit information about a speaker‟s 
personal preferences. Further, across Studies 1 and 2, school-age children‟s ratings of speakers 
were influenced by speakers‟ consistency when the attribute being judged was related to 
information acquisition (e.g., believability, weirdness of speech), but not when it was a general 
characteristic (e.g., friendliness, likeability). In Study 3, 9 and 10 year old children demonstrated 
flexibility in their credibility judgments by preferring to solicit information from inconsistent 
speakers if the speaker was aware of a situational context that normalized the inconsistency. 
Together the findings from the three studies indicate that school-age, but not preschool-age, 
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children can detect emotional inconsistency in speaker cues, use this information to form speaker 
credibility judgments, and use contextual information to think flexibly about speakers‟ 
credibility.  
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Introduction 
  
Children acquire vast amounts of new information throughout childhood. This occurs 
through many methods, for example, through observation, modelling, and trial and error. 
Another common way of learning new information is through the verbal testimony of others 
(e.g., a teacher labelling a novel object; e.g., Harris, 2002). Indeed, verbal testimony is the only 
possible way to impart certain types of information (e.g., historical facts). Therefore, it is 
particularly important for children to develop the ability to learn from others in this way. 
However, children are unable to take in all of the information to which they are exposed. 
Adaptively, they have been shown to be „selective learners‟ in that they are sensitive to a number 
of characteristics that speak to the credibility of the person providing the information, and choose 
to solicit new information from speakers that exhibit these characteristics. Much of the previous 
literature in this area has focused on whether children are sensitive to cues to a speaker‟s 
knowledge (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Scofield & Behrend, 2008). However, the knowledge 
possessed by a speaker is irrelevant if he/she is not able to convey the information in a clear and 
unambiguous manner. Showing appreciation for this notion, children prefer to solicit information 
from speakers who show more clarity in their utterances (Gillis & Nilsen, 2013). The 
overarching goal of this dissertation was to further investigate children‟s sensitivity to the 
manner in which speakers deliver information. Three studies examined whether children 
preferred to solicit information from speakers who provided information in a consistent manner, 
that is, when their nonverbal affect was consistent with the emotional valence of the words 
uttered. The first study assessed whether preschool and school-age children preferred to solicit 
new information from consistent speakers (relative to unknown speakers), compared to 
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inconsistent speakers (i.e., as opposed to inconsistent). The second study examined whether 
children maintained a preference for consistency when soliciting information that did not require 
a correct answer, and further investigated whether children form more positive global 
attributions of consistent, compared to inconsistent, speakers. Finally, the third study assessed 
whether school-age children are able to integrate information regarding the situational context 
and the speaker‟s perspective when deciding on the credibility of consistent and inconsistent 
speakers. By investigating children‟s sensitivity to how information is delivered, these studies 
contribute to the growing literature demonstrating children‟s sophisticated ability to determine 
credible sources of information.  
Children’s Judgments of Speaker Credibility 
Adopting a discriminating stance towards speakers is adaptive given that children are 
exposed to vast amounts of new information from others (e.g., Harris, 2002) and are unable to 
absorb everything. Further, at times it could be detrimental to trust an individual‟s verbal 
testimony (e.g., individuals lie or unknowingly deliver incorrect information). Therefore, it is 
advantageous for children to determine when they should attend to information versus when they 
should ignore it. A large body of research has demonstrated that children are selective when 
deciding from whom to solicit information (see Mills, 2013 for a review). Research on children‟s 
sensitivity to cues to speaker credibility has typically used a paradigm that involves exposing 
children to pairs of speakers who differ in specific ways and provide different information 
(Mills, 2013). After children have had a chance to familiarize themselves with these speakers and 
the type of information they deliver, each speaker provides a conflicting piece of novel 
information (i.e., each speaker labels a novel object with a different word). Children‟s speaker 
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preferences can then be inferred by observing which individual‟s information they choose to 
adopt or apply (e.g., Koenig, Clement & Harris, 2004; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig & Harris, 
2007). Using variations of this methodology, previous research has demonstrated that there are 
many speaker characteristics that children are sensitive to when deciding who is a credible 
source of information. For example, as early as the preschool years, children prefer to learn from 
individuals who are familiar (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & Harris, 2009), adult (compared 
to children; Jaswal & Neely, 2006), non-dissenting (Corriveau et al., 2009), experts (Lutz & 
Keil, 2002), part of their in-group (Elashi & Mills, 2011), and nice (compared to mean; Mascaro 
& Sperber, 2009). Further, children have been shown to mistrust individuals referred to as “big 
liars” (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  
While it can be a helpful strategy for children to rely on speaker characteristics as a way 
to determine trustworthy sources of information, there are occasions where it could lead children 
astray. For example, while adults are generally more credible sources of information than 
children, this is not always the case, especially with regards to child-specific topics (e.g., toys, 
games). Accordingly, another important cue to credibility is the amount of knowledge a person 
has with regards to a certain topic. Researchers have speculated that children see some of the 
speaker characteristics (mentioned above) as indications of speakers‟ knowledge, as per a  large 
body of research demonstrating that children prefer to learn from knowledgeable individuals 
over unknowledgeable individuals (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; 
Corriveau, Meints, & Harris, 2009; Koenig, Clement & Harris, 2004; Scofield & Behrend, 
2008). Children have been shown to use knowledge as a cue to speaker credibility both when 
individuals announce the extent of their knowledge (e.g., saying “I know” compared to “I think,” 
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e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) as well as when they demonstrate their 
knowledge through the accuracy with which information is presented (e.g., accurately or 
inaccurately labelling objects; e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009; Koenig et al., 2004; Scofield & 
Behrend, 2008). Accuracy appears to be a particularly robust cue. For example, 3- and 4-year-
olds continue to trust more accurate speakers a week after exposure (Corriveau & Harris, 2009) 
and 4-and 7-year-olds have been shown to prefer to learn from accurate individuals after only 
one encounter (though the 4-year-olds needed more exposure; Fitneva & Dunfield, 2010).  
Some research suggests that children put greater weight on speakers‟ knowledge 
compared to their other characteristics. For example, 3- and 4-year-olds have been shown to 
prefer to learn from accurate children over inaccurate adults (Jawal & Neely, 2006), as well as 
unfamiliar, but accurate, individuals over inaccurate, but familiar, individuals (Corriveau et al., 
2009; Clement et al., 2004). Further, children have been shown to be sensitive to the type of 
knowledge about which different individuals are likely aware. Specifically, 3-to 5-year-olds were 
more likely to ask adults about the nutritional value of food, while they directed their questions 
regarding toys to children (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Children have also been shown to 
excuse a speaker‟s inaccuracy if it is clear that they do not have access to the relevant 
information (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). By 4 years of age, children demonstrate even 
further sophistication in their decisions regarding from whom to solicit information by tracking 
the relative history of individuals‟ accuracy. Specifically, 4-year-olds preferred to learn from 
individuals who were 75% accurate compared to those who were 25% accurate (Pasquini et al., 
2007). Together, this research suggests that children value the knowledge of speakers and are 
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able to employ complex strategies to reason about which speakers are likely to be credible 
sources of information. 
While knowledge can be an important indicator of whether a speaker will be a good 
source of new information, it becomes irrelevant if speakers are unable to express their 
knowledge clearly. Within the speaker credibility literature, there is a relative lack of research 
investigating whether children are attuned to how a speaker delivers information. However, there 
is some evidence to suggest that children are able to take the how into account when deciding 
from whom to solicit new information. For example, Birch, Akmal and Frampton (2010) found 
that 2-year-olds preferred to learn from individuals who displayed confident non-verbal cues 
(e.g., upright posture with shoulders back and chin high, facial expressions of recognition) as 
opposed to uncertain non-verbal cues (e.g., shoulder shrugging, puzzled facial expressions). 
Similarly, 4- and 5-year-old children favored confident informants over hesitant ones (of note, 
when confidence conflicted with accuracy, preschool-age children‟s speaker choices were at 
chance, but as their age increased, they were more likely to rely on the speakers‟ prior accuracy 
over their confidence; Brosseau-Liard, Cassels, & Birch, 2014). Children have also been shown 
to take bystanders‟ non-verbal cues into account when judging speaker credibility. For example, 
4-year-olds preferred to learn from individuals who delivered information while a bystander was 
nodding and smiling as opposed to shaking her head and frowning (Fusaro & Harris, 2008, see 
also Chudek, Heller, Birch & Henrick, 2012). Further, while no research has investigated 
whether children are sensitive to tone of voice in isolation when determining a speaker‟s 
credibility, it has been demonstrated that children prefer to learn from individuals who speak 
with their native accent as opposed to a foreign accent (Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011), 
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demonstrating that they are attuned to the sound of an individual‟s speech. Speaking more 
directly to children‟s consideration of speakers‟ ability to unambiguously deliver information, 
school-age children preferred to learn from individuals who provided information that 
unambiguously identified an object as opposed to individuals who provided information that was 
accurate, but insufficient to identify the specific object (Gillis & Nilsen, 2013). Given that 
children encounter many other types of ambiguity in communication, beyond lexical ambiguity, 
this dissertation sought to determine whether children are attuned to other types of 
communicative ambiguity and subsequently use them as cues to speaker credibility. More 
specifically, I wondered whether children would be less likely to judge speakers to be credible if 
their non-verbal
1
 affect was discrepant with the lexical information they delivered. Prior to 
posing hypotheses regarding children‟s use of consistency between non-verbal and lexical affect 
information, it is important to review the literature regarding children‟s sensitivity to these two 
streams of communication.  
Children’s Sensitivity to Communicative Cues 
Speakers convey their feelings and intentions through both the content of their statements 
and the manner in which they make their utterances (i.e., non-verbal cues such as tone of voice 
or facial expression). When individuals communicate, their non-verbal cues are often consistent 
with the lexical meaning of the information they deliver (e.g., saying “I‟m happy” in a positive 
tone of voice), which helps to create unambiguous messages for others to interpret. However, 
occasionally, individuals deliver lexical information that is inconsistent with their non-verbal 
cues, which can result in ambiguous communication (i.e., it is unclear which aspects of the 
                                                          
1
 Throughout my dissertation, I use the term “non-verbal” to refer to both tone of voice and facial expression 
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communication more accurately convey the true message). For example, this occurs when 
individuals try to mask their true emotions (e.g., saying “I feel great” in a sad tone of voice), 
when they are being sarcastic (e.g., saying “I‟m really excited about going to school” in an 
unenthusiastic tone of voice) or when trying to be deceptive (e.g., saying “I didn‟t break the 
glass” with a guilty facial expression). Though such inconsistent messages allow for more 
nuanced communicative behaviour (as is the case with sarcasm), they also introduce more room 
for miscommunication to occur. Therefore, it may be advantageous for children to be able to 
detect inconsistencies in communication and use this information to form judgments of speakers‟ 
credibility. For example, it would be adaptive to be skeptical of the information delivered by an 
individual who is being deceptive or masking their true emotions.  
As an initial step in appreciating inconsistencies in messages, children would need to 
show sensitivity to both lexical and non-verbal aspects of the message. Much research has 
demonstrated that very early in development, children are sensitive to vocal tone (Fernald, 1993; 
Clarkson & Clifton, 1985; Zuckerman, Blanck, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1980); indeed, within 
their first year of life, infants show sensitivity to vocal tones and facial expressions indicative of 
different affective states (Barrera & Maurer, 1981; Fernald, 1993; Kuchuk, Vibbert & Bornstein, 
1986; Ridgeway, Waters, & Kuczaj, 1985). Further, by one year of age, children are able to use 
the facial expressions of others to regulate their behaviour (Sorce, Emde, Campos & Klinnert, 
1985). At 4 years old, children can use a speaker‟s vocal affect to interpret ambiguous messages 
(Berman, Chambers, & Graham, 2010) and can label emotions from facial expressions 
(Ridgeway, Waters, & Kuczaj, 1985). Taken together, these results demonstrate that children are 
adept at interpreting non-verbal cues from a very young age.  
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Research investigating children‟s sensitivity to multiple (and possibly divergent) 
communicative cues has been examined using various methodologies. In one paradigm children 
hear statements from speakers (e.g., “My mommy gave me a treat.”) read with either consistent 
(e.g., positive) or inconsistent (e.g., negative) vocal non-verbal cues. Children are then asked to 
indicate how the speaker feels (e.g., happy or sad; e.g., Morton & Trehub, 2001). This 
methodology allows researchers to determine whether children are attending to the words spoken 
or the non-verbal cues (or both) when interpreting the feelings of the speaker. Another paradigm 
involves children hearing instructions from a speaker who uses either consistent (e.g., an 
approving lexical message delivered with approving facial and vocal non-verbal cues) or 
inconsistent (e.g., a disapproving lexical message delivered with approving non-verbal cues) 
cues and observing how a child responds (i.e., whether the child follows the instruction or not 
e.g., Friend, 2001). In general, findings from studies using both paradigms demonstrate that there 
is a developmental progression in how children and adults interpret inconsistent lexical / non-
verbal information. That is, infants demonstrate greater sensitivity to the non-verbal aspects of 
communication but, beginning at 18 months, children base their interpretations on the lexical (as 
opposed to non-verbal cues), showing lexical primacy (e.g., Morton & Trehub, 2001; Friend & 
Bryant, 2000; Lawrence & Fernald, 1993 [as cited in Friend, 2001]; Friend, 2000; 2003; Waxer 
& Morton, 2011). Between the early childhood years and adulthood, an increased reliance on the 
non-verbal information is observed when individuals are asked to interpret inconsistent messages 
(Friend, 2000; Solomon & Ali, 1972). By adulthood, a non-verbal primacy is demonstrated in 
that interpretations of communicative utterances are based on the non-verbal content (e.g., 
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Morton & Trehub, 2001; Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967; Argyle, Alkema, & Gilmour, 1971; Reilly 
& Muzekari, 1986).  
Pertinent to my research question, it is important to establish whether children are in fact 
detecting the lexical / non-verbal inconsistency. For example, it is possible that children 
demonstrate a lexical primacy because they are not processing the non-verbal information when 
there are two streams of information. Indeed, past research suggests that children do not 
consistently demonstrate explicit sensitivity to the inconsistency until about 9 years of age. For 
example, results from the Morton & Trehub (2001) study found that the majority of 4- to 5-year-
old participants did not demonstrate any evidence of an explicit appreciation for the 
inconsistency. By 7 years of age, most children noted that there was something “weird or silly” 
about what the speaker had said. However, up until 8 years of age, children continued to judge 
the speaker as having “expressed her feelings well.” By 9 – 10 years, most children demonstrated 
an explicit awareness of the inconsistency by recognizing that the speaker hadn‟t expressed her 
feelings well. A development in children‟s explicit appreciation of the lexical / non-verbal 
inconsistency has also been demonstrated in a study by Rotenberg, Simourd & Moore (1989) 
who found an increase in the use of a lexical - non-verbal consistency principle in children‟s 
detection of deception across ages 5, 7 and 9. That is, 9-year-olds reliably judged individuals 
who delivered consistent information (e.g., “I like that shirt” said in a neutral tone of voice but 
with a smile) as being truthful and individuals who delivered inconsistent information (e.g., “I do 
not like that coat” said in a neutral tone of voice but with a smile) as lying. Five-year-olds, 
however, demonstrated limited sensitivity to the inconsistency and judged consistently positive 
individuals, but not consistently negative individuals, as being more truthful than both types of 
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inconsistent individuals. Importantly, Morton & Trehub (2001) have found evidence to suggest 
that preschool-age children demonstrate an implicit sensitivity to inconsistent messages: 4- to 10-
year-olds took longer to respond to inconsistent, compared to consistent statements when judging 
individuals‟ emotions. This finding suggests that children as young as 4 years of age process 
both the lexical and non-verbal information to a certain degree, albeit not at an explicit level. 
Further evidence that young children are capable of attending to the non-verbal information 
within inconsistent messages, under specific circumstances, has been demonstrated. For 
example, Morton, Trehub & Zelazo (2003) found that 6-year-olds relied more on the non-verbal 
information when primed to do so.  More specifically, as an initial task, children were asked to 
judge speakers‟ emotions when the lexical content of their statements was neutral and thus were 
forced to focus on the non-verbal information; following this, children were exposed to 
statements that contained discrepant lexical / non-verbal content and were subsequently more 
likely to respond to questions based on the non-verbal content. In addition, Eskritt and Lee 
(2003) found that 3- to 5-year-olds relied more on the non-verbal component of inconsistent 
messages when the nonverbal information was exaggerated. Finally, by 5 years of age, children 
recognize that individuals are capable of expressing emotions (through verbal statements and 
facial expressions) that differ from those that they are experiencing (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
Taken together, these results suggest that younger children (i.e., from approximately 2- to 
8 years old) demonstrate a lexical primacy when interpreting inconsistent lexical / non-verbal 
messages. However, as children mature into adulthood, they gradually begin to demonstrate a 
non-verbal primacy. Further, some evidence suggests that younger children (i.e., 4- to 6 year-
olds) are sensitive to this inconsistency, at least on an implicit level. Children begin to 
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demonstrate an ability to explicitly detect lexical / non-verbal inconsistencies between the ages 
of 7 to 9 years old. Thus, together this research allows for an understanding of children‟s 
sensitivity to various communicative cues, including inconsistency in these cues; however, it is 
unclear how children apply this sensitivity to forming judgments about speakers. 
While no research has investigated whether children use inconsistency between lexical 
and non-verbal affective cues as an indication of a speaker‟s credibility, some research has 
demonstrated that children are attuned to other forms of consistency in non-verbal cues when 
deciding on a speaker‟s credibility. Specifically, at 14 months of age, children have demonstrated 
some ability to be selective in who they trust based on the speakers‟ non-verbal cues (Chow, 
Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008). In particular, they were more likely to trust individuals whose 
non-verbal cues (e.g., saying “wow!” and smiling) were consistent with the context (e.g., looking 
in a box with a toy) as opposed to inconsistent (e.g., looking in an empty box). These results 
suggest that children are attuned to visual and vocal non-verbal cues (e.g., facial expression and 
tone of voice), and the appropriateness of these cues based on the context, when deciding on 
speaker credibility.  
 Over three studies, this dissertation sought to determine whether (in)consistency between 
the affective content of a statement and the non-linguistic delivery influences children‟s 
judgments of speaker credibility. In Study 1, I asked whether preschool and school-age children 
prefer to solicit new information from consistent speakers (relative to unknown speakers) more 
than they choose inconsistent speakers. In Study 2, I investigated whether children demonstrate a 
preference for consistency in other domains, for example, when deciding whether to adopt a 
speaker‟s personal preferences. I also investigated what types of perceptions children have of 
12 
 
consistent, compared to inconsistent speakers (e.g., level of friendliness). Finally, in Study 3, I 
explored whether children are able to integrate information from multiple sources (i.e., 
communicative cue consistency and contextual information) to determine a speaker‟s credibility. 
More specifically, I wondered whether children would be more likely to solicit information from 
a speaker who delivers a lexical statement with inconsistent affective cues, if the context 
explains this inconsistency.  
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Study 1 Introduction 
Occasionally children encounter communications that are delivered with inconsistent 
lexical / non-verbal information; as a result, it is advantageous for children to be sensitive to 
these seemingly ambiguous communications in order to avoid learning from speakers who 
provide information that is prone to misinterpretation or may be an indication that an individual 
is being untruthful. While a large body of research has demonstrated that children are attuned to 
cues to speakers‟ knowledge when judging the credibility of speakers, to my knowledge, there is 
only one study that has investigated whether children use ambiguity in communication to 
determine speaker credibility. I sought to extend the findings of Gillis and Nilsen (2013), which 
demonstrated that 6- and 7-year-olds are sensitive to lexical ambiguity and use this as a cue to 
speaker credibility. Given that children demonstrate an implicit sensitivity to inconsistency in 
lexical / non-verbal cues beginning at 4 years of age, and are able to explicitly detect this 
inconsistency starting around 7 years of age (Morton & Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg et al., 1989), I 
wanted to determine whether children at these ages are able to apply this sensitivity / detection 
by using it to determine speakers‟ credibility. Therefore, the goal of Study 1 was to determine 
whether preschool-age (4 to 5 year old) and school-age (7 to 8 year old) children use 
(in)consistency between lexical / non-verbal cues as an indication of speakers‟ credibility.  
Children completed a speaker affect task in which they were exposed to speakers who 
either delivered information that was consistent (e.g., a positive statement said in a positive tone 
of voice with a positive facial expression) or inconsistent (e.g., a positive statement said in a 
negative tone of voice with a negative facial expression). After being exposed to the type of 
information that a speaker gave, children were asked to indicate whether they wanted to receive a 
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new piece of information from that speaker or from a speaker of whom they had no prior 
knowledge. Therefore, I was able to determine whether there was a difference in how often 
children chose to solicit new information from consistent speakers compared to inconsistent 
speakers. However, this measure did not provide an indication as to why children might prefer to 
solicit information from one type of speaker over another. Therefore, children were also asked to 
indicate how much they believed each speaker. Finally, to assess whether any potential age-
related differences were due to emotion recognition abilities, as well as to link this study in with 
past research on children‟s lexical primacy and the development of a non-verbal primacy (e.g., 
Morton & Trehub, 2001), I asked children to rate how the speakers were feeling in a separate 
task.  
Given that past research indicates that preschool-age children demonstrate limited 
explicit awareness of inconsistencies in lexical and non-verbal information (e.g., Morton & 
Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg et al., 1989), I predicted that 4- and 5- year-olds would not use 
inconsistent lexical / non-verbal information as a cue to decide from whom to solicit information. 
In contrast, as 7-year-old children begin to demonstrate the ability to explicitly detect lexical / 
non-verbal inconsistency (e.g., Morton & Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg et al., 1989), I anticipated 
that the 7- and 8-year-olds would apply their detection of the emotional inconsistency and choose 
to solicit novel information from consistent speakers over inconsistent speakers.  
Study 1 Method 
Participants  
 Twenty 4- and 5-year-olds (12 males, M = 62.15 months, SD = 5.58) and 22 7- and 8-
year-olds (11 males, M = 96.09 months, SD = 8.01) were recruited from a mid-sized North 
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American community and tested individually within a research laboratory. Six additional 
children were tested but not included in the analyses due to difficulties completing the task (n = 
2) or difficulty understanding instructions for the task due to learning English as a second 
language (n = 4). Parents of all included participants reported that their children were fluent in 
English and, as assessed by a standardized measure of receptive vocabulary, all children 
possessed language skills sufficient to understand the statements in the videos.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually by an experimenter in a quiet room within the 
research laboratory. The speaker affect task was always administered first, followed by a 
language task, feeling rating task and an emotion recognition task. 
Speaker Affect Task. The speaker affect task was different from a common speaker 
reliability procedure where children are presented with two speakers and then are required to 
choose which speaker they would like to „learn‟ from. In our task, children were exposed to one 
speaker at a time and subsequently asked whether they wanted to solicit information from this 
speaker or from an individual of whom they had no prior knowledge. The rationale for this 
change in methodology was twofold. First, it is not often in children‟s everyday life that they 
hear conflicting information from two sources (one right after the other) and have to decide 
which piece of information to choose. Rather, it is more often the case that they are exposed to 
one source of information that they can either attend to (or solicit information from) or not. My 
methodology was more closely aligned with this everyday situation (relative to the two speaker 
methodology of previous work); the option of an unknown speaker provided children with a 
neutral alternative, creating a situation where children had to base their decisions solely on the 
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information that one speaker provided (i.e., as opposed to weighing their choice against the 
information that a second speaker provided). Second, the present methodology reduced the 
working memory demands of the task by only requiring children to hold information from one 
speaker in mind. Working memory was taken into consideration due to the fact that children 
were being asked to pay attention to information in two communication channels (i.e., 
verbal/lexical and non-verbal), which differs from past studies that manipulated only one aspect 
of speakers‟ characteristics or information (e.g., familiarity, accent, knowledge). Previous 
research has demonstrated that children are capable of making judgments about single speakers 
(i.e., as opposed to comparing two different speakers; Birch et al., 2010; Koenig & Woodward, 
2010; Nurmsoo & Robinson 2009), suggesting that this change would not have reduced the 
ability to demonstrate an effect.  
The children‟s task was to watch video-recorded speakers, one at a time, and decide 
whether to solicit information from the shown speaker or from another individual (about whom 
children had no information; Figure 1). Speakers differed in the consistency with which they 
delivered affective information. Specifically, speakers provided positive or negative lexical 
information, and positive or negative non-verbal cues. This allowed for four speaker types: 
consistent positive (Pos-Lex/Pos-NV: positive statement said with positive non-verbal cues), 
consistent negative (Neg-Lex/Neg-NV: negative statement said with negative non-verbal cues) 
and two inconsistent (Pos-Lex/Neg-NV: positive statement said with negative non-verbal cues; 
Neg-Lex/Pos-NV: negative statement said with positive non-verbal cues). For positive non-
verbal cues, speakers were instructed to sound happy, smile, and use speech that was faster, 
higher pitched, had more pitch variability and more intensity. For negative non-verbal cues, 
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speakers were instructed to sound sad, bring their eyebrows down into a sad frown, and use 
speech that was slower, lower pitched, with less pitch variability and less intensity. The audio 
files of speakers‟ statements were analyzed with the program PRAAT (Boersma, 2001) and 
subjected to 2 (Lexical valence: positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) 
repeated measures ANOVAs.  The dependent variable was the mean of each speaker type for 
each of the paralinguistic variables (duration of utterance, pitch mean, pitch standard deviation, 
intensity). Analyses for all paralinguistic variables revealed a main effect for Non-verbal 
valence, ps < .001. No other significant effects were found (ps > .17). Thus, as designed, the 
paralinguistic cues differed in the intended direction across the non-verbal, but not lexical, 
conditions (i.e., happy speech was rated as higher pitched, with greater pitch variability and 
higher intensity). All 12 speakers were Caucasian women with brown hair pulled back from their 
face. To help children to easily differentiate between the speakers, each speaker wore a uniquely 
coloured t-shirt. The type of information provided by each speaker was counterbalanced across 
children (i.e., one speaker delivered consistent information to one child but inconsistent 
information to another child). Further, the content of the statement (see Appendix A for the 
statements) delivered by each speaker was randomized, as well as the order in which children 
encountered each of the 12 speakers and the order of the type of information delivered (i.e., 
consistent or inconsistent). Children were told that their task was to figure out a story by 
soliciting details from different speakers. To highlight that there was a „correct‟ answer and 
increase motivation for obtaining accurate information, children were told that at the end of the 
task, the real story would be consulted and they would receive a stamp for every correct detail.  
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Children completed 12 trials (three per speaker type) while seated at a table in front of a 
computer and book. Each trial began with the children watching a video-recorded speaker 
making a statement. Next, children decided whether they wanted to solicit a missing detail of the 
story from that speaker or from a different individual about whom they had no information (i.e., 
speaker choice; “Do you want this girl to help you figure out part of the story or another girl?”). 
Choices were scored „1‟ if the speaker was chosen or „0‟ if the other girl was chosen (i.e., a 
possible total of 3 for each of the 4 speaker types). After their choice, children rated how 
believable the speaker was with the aid of a visual scale (i.e., speaker rating; “How much do you 
believe this girl? Not at all, not much, mostly or very much”)2. Ratings were scored from a 1 (not 
at all) to a 4 (very much).  
Each page of the book depicted a question about the story (e.g., “What did Johnny eat for 
breakfast?”) as well as two contradicting responses with pictures: one from the speaker and one 
from the other girl (i.e., each girl was pictured with their response in a speech bubble). 
Importantly, children did not see the page showing the „other girl‟ or depicting the girls‟ 
responses until after making their decision. This ensured that participants did not base their 
responses on personal preferences.  
At two specified times, (before beginning the task and after trial 6) children completed 
four stimuli checks to ensure that they understood what the individuals were saying and could 
                                                          
2 To ensure that the question, “How much do you believe this girl?” was appropriate for the age groups, a random 
subsection of children (30% of the sample, two-thirds of whom were 4 years old) were asked further questions. 
These children were introduced to two different girls who were described as follows: “This girl is very tricky, she 
always lies and doesn‟t like to help people. This girl is not tricky, she always tells the truth and tries to help people.” 
After this children were told a new piece of information from each girl and asked “How much do you believe this 
girl?” The rating scale provided for a response was identical to that used in the study. All children rated the truthful 
girl as „believable‟, while all but one child rated the lying girl as „not believable‟.  
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accurately judge their emotions. The trials involved children watching two consistently positive 
speakers and two consistently negative speakers. For two of these manipulation check trials, 
children were asked to repeat what the speaker had said and to decide whether the statement was 
happy or sad. For the other two trials, children were asked whether the speaker‟s voice sounded 
happy or sad. The purpose of these trials was to ensure that children of all ages were able to 
clearly understand the speakers‟ words and detect the emotion that she was displaying.  
Language Task. The Picture Vocabulary subtest of the Test of Language Development 
Primary Third Edition (TOLD-P:3; Newcomer & Hammill, 1997) was administered. On this test 
children were asked to point to the picture that represented the word spoken by the experimenter. 
This test was administered in a standardized fashion with the purpose of ensuring that all 
children had language skills sufficient to understand the statements in the videos (i.e., in the 
average range for a 4 year old).  
Feeling Ratings Task. This task was administered to determine whether there were age 
differences in affect recognition abilities. Children watched 12 new videos depicting different 
speakers than those in the Speaker Affect task, but who said the same statements (i.e., resulting 
in the same four speaker types). The order of speakers and type of information delivered by each 
speaker was counterbalanced across children. After watching each speaker, children rated (with 
the aid of a visual scale) how the speaker was feeling, from 1(mostly sad) to 3(mostly happy). 
The verbal instructions of the rating were accompanied with a visual aid depicting a happy face, 
neutral face and a sad face.  
Study 1 Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
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All children accurately repeated the content of the 8 statements in the manipulation check 
trials and correctly labeled the valence of the statements, suggesting that they were able to 
comprehend the speakers‟ statements as well as identify the appropriate valence.  
Speaker Choice 
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s speaker preferences, a 2 (Age: preschool- versus school-age) X 2 (lexical valence: 
positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted. The dependent variable was the mean of children‟s speaker choices for each of the 4 
speaker types (see Table 1; i.e., children‟s choices were scored a 1 if they chose to solicit 
information from the speaker or a 0 if they chose to solicit information from the other 
individual). Results revealed a significant 3 way interaction between age, lexical valence and 
non-verbal valence, F(1, 40) = 19.75, p < .001, p
2
 = .33. To further explore this interaction, two 
2-way interactions (lexical valence X non-verbal valence) were conducted (one for each age 
group). For both age groups, the 2-way interaction was significant (preschool-age: F(1, 19) = 
17.79, p < .001, p
2
 = .48; school-age: F(1, 21) = 55.16, p < .001, p
2
 = .72). To interpret the 
significant interactions, follow-up paired t-tests (with Bonferroni correction, due to the large 
number of comparisons; i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting in a p value of .008) were conducted.  
Preschool-age. Preschool-age children chose to solicit information from the consistently 
positive speakers (i.e., pos-lex/pos-nv) over unknown speakers to a greater extent than both of 
the inconsistent speakers (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(19) = 3.24, p = .004, d = .70; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(19) = 
3.86, p = .001, d = 1.03, as well as the consistently negative speakers, t(19) = 2.93, p = .001, d = 
.90. There were no other differences between speaker types, ps > .44. One-sample t-tests 
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revealed that preschoolers chose consistently negative speakers (over unknown speakers), as well 
as both types of inconsistent speakers, less than expected by chance (neg-lex/neg-nv: t(19) = 
3.56, p = .002, d = 1.03; neg-lex/pos-nv: t(19) = 2.30, p = .03; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(19) = 4.61, p < 
.001. They chose consistently positive speakers, over unknown speakers, at chance-levels, p = 
.44.  
School-age. School-age children chose to solicit information from consistently positive 
speakers, over unknown speakers, to a greater extent than both inconsistent speakers (neg-
lex/pos-nv: t(21) = 8.44, p < .001, d = 2.61; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(21) = 7.09, p < .001, d = 2.25), but 
not more than consistently negative speakers (p = .05). Importantly, they also preferred to solicit 
information from consistently negative speakers, over unknown speakers, more than both 
inconsistent speakers (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(21) = 5.85, p < .001, d = 1.79; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(21) = 
4.83, p < .001, d = 1.52). There was no difference between children‟s preference for the two 
inconsistent speakers, p = .33. Therefore, school-age children showed a preference for both types 
of consistent speakers (relative to unknown speakers), over both types of inconsistent speakers. 
Further analyses revealed that consistently positive speakers were chosen more often than 
chance: t(21) = 3.50, p = .002, while both inconsistent speakers were chosen less often than 
chance (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(21) = 9.76, p < .001; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(21) = 7.31, p < .001), 
suggesting that these speakers were actively avoided. Consistently negative speakers were 
chosen at chance-levels, p = .35. 
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Comparisons between age groups revealed that, relative to school-age children, preschool-
age children were less likely to choose the consistently negative speakers, t(40) = 3.18, p = .003, 
d = 1.00), with no other significant differences, ps > .04. 
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Speaker Belief Ratings 
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s speaker ratings, a 2(Age: preschool- versus school-age) X 2(Lexical valence: positive, 
negative) X 2(Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA was conducted; 
Table 1). The dependent variable was the mean speaker rating for each speaker type. Results 
revealed a significant 3-way interaction between age, lexical valence and non-verbal valence, 
F(1, 40) = 24.73, p < .001, p
2
 = .38. To further explore this interaction, two 2 way ANOVAs 
(lexical valence X non-verbal valence) were conducted (one for each age group). For both age 
groups, the 2 way interaction was significant (preschool-age: F(1, 19) = 9.84 p = .005, p
2
 = .34; 
school-age: F(1, 21) = 91.89, p < .001, p
2
 = .81). To interpret these interactions, follow up t-tests 
were conducted with Bonferroni correction; i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting in a p value of 
.008).  
Preschool-age. Preschool-age children rated the consistently positive speakers as more 
believable than both of the inconsistent speakers (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(19) = 4.62, p < .001, d = 
.1.57; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(19) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 1.54), as well as the consistently negative 
speakers, (t(19) = 3.72, p = .001, d = 1.31). There were no other differences, ps > .65. Therefore, 
                                                          
3
 Due to the restricted range in children‟s choice data, we conducted non-parametric analyses for both age groups 
using the Friedman test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test with Bonferroni correction. Results showed an identical 
pattern, with the exception that preschoolers‟ choice of consistently positive speakers no longer differed from the 
consistently negative speakers (p = 0.02).  
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preschool-age children rated consistently positive speakers as more believable than the other 
three speaker types.  
School-age. School-age children rated the consistently positive speakers as more 
believable than both of the inconsistent speakers (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(21) = 13.28, p < .001, d = 
.3.97; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(21) = 7.67, p < .001, d = 2.82), and the consistently negative speakers, 
t(21) = 3.78, p = .001, d = .71. Importantly, they rated consistently negative speakers as more 
believable than both of the inconsistent speakers (neg-lex/pos-nv: t(21) = 9.48, p < .001, d = 
2.77; pos-lex/neg-nv: t(21) = 6.19, p < .001, d = 2.02). There was no difference between 
children‟s ratings of the two inconsistent speakers, p = .36. Therefore, school-age children rated 
both types of consistent speakers as more believable than both types of inconsistent speakers.  
Of note, compared to school-age children, preschool-age children rated both types of 
inconsistent speakers as more believable (neg-lex/pos-nv speakers: t(40) = 4.74, p < .001, d = 
1.45; pos-lex/neg-nv speakers: t(40) = 3.09, p = .004, d = .96, with a trend for consistently 
negative speakers to be rated as less believable, t(40) = 2.53, p = .02, d = .78).  
Speaker Feeling Ratings  
To determine whether age affected affect recognition, a 2(Age: preschool- versus school-
age) X 2(Lexical valence: positive, negative) X 2(Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed 
model ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable was the mean rating of each of the 4 
speaker types (i.e., from 1 (mostly sad) to 3 (mostly happy); see Table 1). This analysis was done 
to determine whether potential differences between preschool-age and school-age children on the 
speaker affect task were due to differences in emotion recognition abilities.  
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Results revealed a main effect of lexical valence, F(1, 40) = 34.30, p < .001, p
2 = .46, such 
that children of both ages rated individuals who made positive statements as being happier than 
those who made negative statements. Further, there was a main effect of non-verbal valence, F(1, 
40) = 135.71, p < .001, p
2 = .77, such that children of both ages rated individuals who delivered 
statements with positive non-verbal cues as happier than individuals who delivered statements 
with negative non-verbal cues. There were no other significant effects, ps > .15, including age, 
suggesting that preschool-age and school-age children were similar in their ratings of how each 
of the 4 speaker types were feeling. Thus, it is unlikely that the age differences noted in the main 
analyses above (i.e., speaker choice and speaker ratings) were due to differences in children‟s 
emotion recognition skills.  
Study 1 Discussion 
There are a number of avenues by which speakers share information about their intentions 
and feelings. While speakers often demonstrate consistency between the various channels 
through which they convey affect, there are occasions when lexical information is inconsistent 
with the non-verbal cues with which it is delivered. The goal of Study 1 was to examine whether 
preschool- and school-age children use (in)consistency between what a speaker says and how it 
is said to determine speaker credibility.  
Results showed that school-age children preferred to solicit new information from speakers 
who showed consistency between the words uttered and the non-verbal cues provided. 
Specifically, in a context where the goal was to obtain accurate information, they solicited 
information from consistently positive speakers as well as consistently negative speakers (over 
unknown speakers) to a greater extent than inconsistent speakers. School-age children‟s ratings 
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of speakers‟ believability showed a similar pattern, namely, that both types of consistent 
speakers were found to be more believable than inconsistent speakers. In contrast, preschool-age 
children did not show a preference for consistency. That is, although children in this age group 
preferred consistently positive speakers, they solicited (or rather, tended not to solicit) 
information from consistently negative speakers at an equivalent rate to the inconsistent 
speakers. These findings add to previous work demonstrating children‟s preference for speaker 
consistency in other forms (i.e., consistency between non-verbal cues and context; Chow et al., 
2008; Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013). Given that inconsistent utterances introduce ambiguity 
into communication, school-age children may have chosen not to solicit information from 
inconsistent speakers because they believed they would provide poor quality information. Past 
work demonstrates that school-age (and to a lesser extent, preschool-age) children, use 
communicative ambiguity as a cue to speaker credibility (i.e., they prefer individuals who 
provide information that unambiguously identifies an object compared to those who provide 
information that is accurate but insufficient to identify the object; Gillis & Nilsen, 2013). 
However, inconsistency between cues is also seen to be indicative of lying (Rotenberg et al., 
1989). In this study, school-age children rated the inconsistent speakers to be less believable than 
the consistent speakers, suggesting they may have viewed these speakers as more deceitful.  
A developmental progression was observed in application of this lexical/non-verbal 
consistency principle: In contrast to school-age children, preschool-age children did not show a 
preference for consistency, instead, they solicited (or rather, tended not to solicit) information 
from consistently negative speakers at an equivalent rate to the inconsistent speakers. It is 
unlikely that these age-differences were related to affect recognition abilities as there were no 
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age differences in children‟s ratings of the speakers‟ feelings. Further, these results are consistent 
with previous research demonstrating that five-year-olds judged consistently positive speakers to 
be more truthful than consistently negative speakers (Rotenberg et al., 1989). It may also be the 
case that preschool-age children did not detect the inconsistency in the messages. Certainly, 
previous work has found that the explicit recognition of inconsistency between lexical/non-
verbal information begins around 6 – 7 years of age (Morton & Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg et al., 
1989).  
Despite the developmental differences, results indicate that preschool-age children were 
processing both lexical and non-verbal cues. Specifically, if they were only sensitive to one of 
these cues, I would have observed a different result for the two inconsistent speakers. Instead, 
preschoolers were equally unlikely to solicit information from both types of inconsistent 
speakers, and rated them as equally unbelievable. Essentially, preschoolers tended to avoid 
soliciting information from speakers who demonstrated any amount of negativity. This result, 
demonstrating younger children‟s awareness of negativity and subsequent avoidance of speakers, 
is consistent with a negativity bias; which Vaish, Grossman and Woodward (2008) argue 
develops in infancy and serves an evolutionary purpose. I speculate that school-age children‟s 
decisions did not solely reflect a negativity bias because they valued the consistency over the 
emotional valence of the speakers‟ statements. However, school-age children rated consistently 
positive speakers as more believable than consistently negative speakers, demonstrating that 
school-age children were influenced, to a certain extent, by speakers‟ affective valence.  
These results add to a growing body of literature demonstrating the sophistication with which 
children determine credible sources of information: they suggest that individuals who display 
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non-verbal cues that are inconsistent with the words they utter are seen as less trustworthy than 
individuals who display consistent communicative cues. However, it may be the case that 
school-age children just generally prefer individuals who show consistency in their 
communicative behaviour. That is, it is not clear whether the preference demonstrated is specific 
to the acquisition of novel information. Therefore, in Study 2, I investigated how far children 
extend their preference for consistent speakers. In particular, I wanted to know whether children 
demonstrated a preference for consistent speakers when making decisions that do not have a 
correct answer. More specifically, I asked whether children were more likely to adopt the 
personal preferences of consistent (versus inconsistent) speakers. Further, I wanted to determine 
whether children‟s preference for consistent speakers could be attributed to factors that are not 
important for accurate information delivery; accordingly I asked whether children would rate 
consistent and inconsistent speakers differently on dimensions of friendliness and likeability.  
Moreover, there may be instances where inconsistency between a speaker‟s words and non-
verbal affect becomes more appropriate when contextual information is provided. For example, it 
makes more sense to sound upset when indicating you have to play soccer (a game you usually 
enjoy), when the weather is bad, relative to when the weather is good. A remaining question, 
which will be addressed in Study 3, is whether children treat all inconsistent speakers similarly 
or whether there are certain communicative contexts where emotional inconsistency is accepted.  
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Study 2 Introduction 
Study 1 provided insight into whether children are able to apply their sensitivity to 
inconsistent lexical / non-verbal cues by preferring to solicit information from consistent 
speakers. However, beyond the believability of each speaker, it is unclear what other inferences 
children made regarding the speakers. It is possible that school-age children chose to solicit 
information from consistent speakers because they used the consistency as a cue to other speaker 
characteristics that they use to determine speaker credibility. For example, one possibility is that 
children prefer to solicit information from consistent or positive speakers because they are seen 
as being nicer or more pleasant interaction partners. Indeed, past research has demonstrated that 
children prefer to solicit information from speakers who are seen as nice, compared to mean 
(Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Further, while it has often been suggested that children make 
inferences about speakers‟ knowledge based on speaker characteristics, a study by Brosseau-
Liard and Birch (2010) suggests that children also make inferences about speakers‟ 
characteristics based on speakers‟ knowledge. Specifically, they found that 5 year old children 
predicted knowledgeable speakers to be more prosocial (i.e., nicer) than unknowledgeable 
speakers. Therefore, the first goal of Study 2 was to address the question of what characteristics 
(beyond believability) children ascribe to the speakers. More specifically, I investigated other 
attributions, beyond speaker believability, that could account for children‟s reliance on 
consistency of communicative cues when deciding the credibility of the speakers, as well as 
whether the valence of the affect makes a difference to the types of attributions that children 
make.  
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I investigated several different attributions that children may form in response to 
inconsistent, compared to consistent, speakers. Children were asked to make judgments about 
how friendly speakers were and how much they liked the speakers. The reason for choosing 
these attributions is that they play a role in determining from whom children prefer to learn 
(Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). This is logical given that social interaction is a key part of soliciting 
information from an individual. For example, if a child thinks it will be unpleasant to solicit 
information from a mean individual, they might be inclined to ask the nicer, but less 
knowledgeable speaker. Indeed, recent research by Landrum, Mills and Johnston (2013), 
demonstrated that children are less likely to trust an expert if they are mean as opposed to nice. 
Further, nice individuals may in fact be more likely to help others out by delivering accurate 
information. Given that both age groups rated consistently positive speakers as more believable 
than all other speakers, and chose consistently positive speakers at rates that were higher than 
their choices of inconsistent speakers, I anticipated that consistently positive speakers would 
receive the highest friendliness and likeability ratings. However, I was most interested in how the 
consistently negative speakers would be rated. If the consistently negative speakers were also 
rated highly on positive attributions (i.e., friendliness and likeability), it would seem that children 
use consistency as an indication of positive speaker characteristics more generally, and use these 
characteristics to determine speaker credibility. If, however, consistently negative speakers are 
not viewed as having generally positive characteristics, this would suggest that the preference for 
these speakers in Study 1 was driven by other inferences about the speakers (e.g., speaker 
knowledge).  
30 
 
Next, I sought to examine whether children are more likely to use the personal 
preferences of consistently positive speakers compared to consistently negative speakers, as well 
as consistent, compared to inconsistent, speakers. This question expands on the findings from 
Study 1 in which children‟s task was to solicit accurate information from others (i.e., their goal 
was to get as many details of the story “right” as possible). While it is advantageous for children 
to be attuned to cues that indicate a speaker is likely to deliver accurate information, there are 
also times when they would need to make decisions regarding unfamiliar information when there 
is no “right” answer (e.g., when making a decision based on personal preference). For example, 
if a child is asked to decide between two unfamiliar toys as a present, he / she might not know 
how to make a decision. One source of information that could help children make decisions 
when there is no “right” or “wrong” answer could be the personal preferences of others. I 
predicted that children of both ages would not use (in)consistency as a cue to deciding whether to 
receive information regarding speaker‟s personal preferences. More specifically, though 
speculative, I hypothesized that school-age children were attuned to (in)consistency in Study 1 
because it indicated whether the speakers would be able to provide accurate information; 
therefore, when the speakers provide information regarding their personal preferences in Study 2, 
the consistency of their lexical / non-verbal cues might not be relevant to children‟s decisions. 
Therefore, I predicted that children would not rely on the consistency between speakers‟ 
affective cues when deciding between speakers; instead, I anticipated that children would choose 
each speaker type at chance rates. It is worth noting, however, that if children are using 
consistency as a cue to speaker “friendliness” or “likeability,” it may be possible that children 
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take consistency into account when making decisions regarding speakers‟ personal preferences 
(i.e., they may prefer the personal preferences of someone they like).  
Recall that the developmental differences noted in Study 1 (i.e., that school-age children, 
but not preschool-age children, showed a preference for consistency) were consistent with 
previous work showing that it isn‟t until 7 years of age that children explicitly detect 
inconsistency (Morton & Trehub, 2001). Study 2 gave me the opportunity to examine this more 
directly within our paradigm. Specifically, I examined whether children were able to explicitly 
detect the (in)consistency between lexical and non-verbal cues, by asking them whether they 
noticed anything weird or tricky about the way the individual spoke. I predicted that, consistent 
with previous research (Morton & Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg et al., 1989), school-age but not 
preschool-age children would be able to explicitly state that the inconsistent speakers had said 
something “tricky or weird.”  
Study 2 Method 
Participants  
 Twenty three children aged 4- and 5-years-old (12 males, M = 61.35 months, SD = 6.10) 
and 21 children aged 7- and 8-years-old (12 males, M = 95.29 months, SD = 7.86) were recruited 
from the community in Waterloo, Ontario. Five additional children were tested, but their data 
were not included in the analyses due to difficulties with completing the task. More specifically, 
each of these children struggled with inattention or compliance to the degree that they were 
unable to complete a sufficient number of the trials (e.g., not watching the videos due to 
fidgeting, refusing to give an answer to the examiner). Parents of all included participants 
reported that their children were fluent in English and, as assessed by a standardized measure of 
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receptive vocabulary, all children possessed language skills sufficient to understand the 
statements in the videos.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually by an experimenter in a quiet room within the 
research laboratory. The Speaker Personal Preferences Task was always administered first, 
followed by a receptive language task. 
Speaker Personal Preferences Task. This task was similar to the task in Study 1 and the 
same videos were used. The key difference in the tasks was in the type of choice children were 
asked to make and the characteristics on which children rated the speakers. As with Study 1, 
speakers differed in the consistency with which they delivered affective information, resulting in 
the same four different types of speakers as Study 1.  
To provide children with information regarding speakers‟ personal preferences, they were 
told that each speaker they would see had picked her favourite sticker and put it in a cup. The 
cups were opaque so the children were not able to see the stickers until after the task was 
complete. Each cup had a small image of the speaker on top so it was clear which cup contained 
the speaker‟s favourite sticker. The children‟s task was to listen to each speaker and then decide 
whether to keep that speaker‟s favourite sticker for themselves, or keep the favourite sticker of 
another girl to whom they had had no exposure. This allowed us to determine whether 
consistency impacted children‟s decisions to use, or not use, a speaker‟s personal preference 
when choosing between unknown items. More specifically, after watching a video of a speaker, 
children were shown pictures of the speaker from the video and an unknown girl. Then a cup was 
placed beside each of the two pictures and a speech bubble from each girl that said, “This is my 
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favourite sticker.” Once children made their choices, the cup with the sticker they wanted to keep 
was placed in a pile with the label “mine to keep.” Children were told that they would get to 
open the cups at the end of the task to see the stickers that they had chosen and to take them 
home.  
Children completed 12 trials while seated at a table in front of a computer and book. Each 
of the 12 pages of the book, placed in front of the children, showed the speaker from the video 
and a picture of the other girl. The pages depicted the girls saying “This is my favourite sticker” 
in a speech bubble, and the cups containing the stickers were placed next to each speaker. Once 
children made their choices, the cup with the sticker they wanted to keep was placed in a pile 
with the label “mine to keep,” while the other cup was placed in a pile that was labeled “not 
mine.” Importantly, children did not open the cups and see the stickers until the end of the task. 
In this way, we ensured that participants were not basing their responses on the stickers 
themselves. Children repeated this process for all 12 trials (i.e., as in Study 1, there were three 
trials for each of the four speaker types). The trials were randomized in the same way as they 
were in Study 1. 
Each trial began with the children watching a video-recorded speaker making a statement 
(i.e., to learn what type of information she gave: consistent or inconsistent). Next, children 
decided whether they wanted to keep the sticker the speaker preferred or the sticker that another 
girl, of whom they had no prior knowledge, preferred (i.e., speaker choice; “This girl likes the 
sticker in this cup best, the other girl likes the sticker in this cup best, which one do you want?”). 
After making their choice, children were asked three questions about the speaker: “How much do 
you like this girl? Not at all, not much, mostly, very much” (speaker liking), “How friendly is 
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this girl? Not at all, not much, mostly, very much” (speaker friendliness), and “Was there 
anything weird or tricky about what this girl said? Yes or no” (speaker weirdness). As in Study 
1, the verbal instructions of the rating were accompanied by visual scales depicting the options in 
differently sized bars. Children‟s choices for stickers were scored as „1‟ if they chose to keep the 
sticker from the speaker or „0‟ if they chose to keep the sticker from the other individual. They 
received a score of „1‟ if children indicated that the speaker‟s responses were „weird‟ and „0‟ if 
not. Liking and friendliness ratings ranged from a 1 (not at all) to a 4 (very much). 
Identical to Study 1, on two occasions (before beginning the task and after trial 6), 
children completed four stimuli checks to ensure that they were able to understand what the 
individuals were saying and accurately judge the emotions of the speaker. The purpose of these 
trials was to ensure that children of all ages were able to clearly understand the speakers‟ words 
and detect the emotion that she was displaying.  
Language Task. To ensure that all children who participated had a receptive vocabulary 
sufficient to complete the task, the Picture Vocabulary subtest of the Test of Language 
Development Primary Third Edition (TOLD-P:3, Newcomer & Hammill, 1997) was 
administered in a standardized fashion. This task required children to point to pictures that 
represented words spoken by the experimenter. 
Study 2 Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
All children accurately repeated the content of the 8 statements in the stimuli check trials 
and correctly labelled the non-verbal emotion cues of the statements, suggesting that they were 
able to comprehend the speakers‟ statements as well as identify the appropriate emotions.  
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Speaker Choice 
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s speaker preferences, a 2 (Age: preschool- versus school-age) X 2 (Lexical valence: 
positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted. The dependent variable was the mean of children‟s speaker choices for each of the 4 
speaker types (see Table 2). Results revealed a main effect of non-verbal valence, (F(1, 42) = 
8.95, p = .003, p
2
 = .18), which was qualified by a significant 3 way interaction between age, 
lexical valence and non-verbal valence, (F(1, 42) = 9.83, p = .003, p
2
 = .19). There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions ps > .08. To explore the 3 way interaction, two 2-
way interactions (lexical valence X non-verbal valence) were conducted (one for each age 
group). For both age groups, the 2-way interaction was significant (preschool-age: F(1, 22) = 
4.59, p = .04, p
2
 = .17; school-age: F(1, 20) = 5.12, p = .04, p
2
 = .21). As discussed below, 
paired t-tests (with Bonferroni correction; i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting in a p value of .008) 
were conducted to interpret significant interactions.  
Preschool-age. Once the Bonferroni correction was applied, none of the preschool-age 
children‟s speaker choices were significantly different from one another (ps > .02), suggesting 
that preschool-age children did not interpret any particular type of speaker as having more 
desirable personal preferences (i.e., sticker preference). However, preschool-age children chose 
the stickers that the neg-lex / neg-nv speakers liked at less than chance, t(22) = -2.65, p = .01, d 
=.57, and the rest of the speakers at chance ps > .30. This suggests that preschool-age children 
avoided choosing to keep stickers that consistently negative speakers liked.  
36 
 
School-age. School-age children chose the stickers preferred by consistently positive 
speakers to a greater extent than the inconsistent pos-lex / neg-nv speakers: t(20) = 3.28, p = 
.004, d = 1.11. This suggests that school-age children interpreted consistently positive speakers 
as having more desirable personal preferences. No other comparisons were significant, ps > .03. 
School-age children chose the stickers that the pos-lex / pos-nv speakers liked at greater than 
chance, t(20) = 3.24, p = .004, d = .70; other speakers were chosen at chance-levels, ps>.006. 
This indicates that school-age children were attuned to speakers‟ positivity and chose to keep 
stickers that consistently positive speakers liked.  
Comparisons between the age groups revealed that, relative to school-age children, 
preschool-age children were less likely to choose the consistently positive speakers, t(42) = 2.42, 
p = .02, d = .71). There were no significant differences between the age groups in their choices 
of inconsistent speakers or consistently negative speakers, ps > .06
4
.  
Speaker “Liking” Ratings 
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s ratings of how much they liked the speakers, a 2 (Age: preschool- versus school-age) 
X 2 (Lexical valence: positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed 
model ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable was the means of children‟s speaker 
liking ratings for each of the 4 speaker types; see Table 2). Results revealed a main effect of non-
verbal valence (F(1, 42) = 25.12, p < .001, p
2
 = .37) and a main effect of lexical valence (F(1, 
42) = 20.04, p < .001, p
2 = .32). These main effects were qualified by a significant 2 way 
                                                          
4
 Due to the restricted range in children‟s choice data, non-parametric analyses on each age range were conducted 
using the Friedman test and then Wilcoxon signed-rank test with Bonferroni correction. Results showed an identical 
pattern with the exception that the significant difference in school-age children‟s choices between the consistently 
positive speaker and the pos-neg speaker did not remain (p = .01). 
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interaction between non-verbal and lexical valence, F(1, 42) = 16.80, p < .001, p
2 = .29. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .09. To interpret the 2 way interaction, 
follow up t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni correction (i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting 
in a p value of .008). Children of both ages gave consistently positive speakers higher likeability 
ratings than all other speakers types (neg-lex / neg-nv: t(43) = 6.92, p < .001, d = 1.03; pos-lex / 
neg-nv: t(43) = 6.28, p < .001, d = .89; neg-lex / pos-nv: t(43) = 5.87, p < .001, d = .97). No other 
speaker types were significantly different from one another, ps > .10. These findings suggest that 
children of both ages thought consistently positive speakers were more likeable and tended to 
rate speakers who demonstrated any kind of negativity as less likeable.  
Speaker “Friendliness” Ratings 
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s speaker ratings, a 2 (Age: preschool- versus school-age) X 2 (Lexical valence: 
positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted. The dependent variable was the mean of children‟s speaker friendliness ratings for 
each of the 4 speaker types; see Table 2). Results revealed a main effect for non-verbal valence 
(F(1, 42) = 25.11, p < .001, p
2
 = .37) and a main effect for lexical valence (F(1, 42) = 4.38, p = 
.04, p
2
 = .09). These main effects were qualified by a 2 way interaction between non-verbal 
valence and lexical valence (F(1, 42) = 19.11, p < .001, p
2
 = .31), as well as a 3 way interaction 
between age, lexical valence and non-verbal valence, F(1, 42) = 17.02, p < .001, p
2
 = .29. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .14. To further explore the 3 way 
interaction, two 2 way ANOVAs  (lexical valence X non-verbal valence) were conducted (one 
for each age group).  
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Preschool-age. For the preschool-age children, there was a main effect of non-verbal 
valence: F(1, 22) = 9.85, p = .005, p
2
 = .31, such that speakers who delivered positive non-
verbal cues were rated as more friendly than speakers who delivered negative non-verbal cues. 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions, ps > .64. Therefore, preschool-age 
children were more likely to judge speakers as friendly if they delivered positive non-verbal 
cues, regardless of the lexical information delivered.  
School-age. For the school-age children, the 2-way interaction between lexical and non-
verbal valence was significant: (F(1, 20) = 25.89, p < .001, p
2
 = .56). To interpret these 
interactions, follow up t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni correction. School-age children 
rated the consistently positive speakers as friendlier than all other speakers (neg-lex / neg-nv: 
t(20) = 4.91, p < .001, d = 1.42; pos-lex / neg-nv: t(20) = 7.29, p < .001, d = 1.96; neg-lex / pos-
nv: t(20) = 5.29, p < .001, d = 1.24). No other comparisons were significantly different from one 
another, ps > .15. Therefore, school-age children were more likely to judge speakers as friendly 
if they demonstrated consistently positive cues. In addition, children perceived speakers showing 
any negativity (lexical or non-verbal) as less friendly.  
Comparisons between the age groups revealed that, relative to preschool-age children, 
school-age children rated the consistently positive speakers as more friendly, t(42) = 2.59, p = 
.01, d = .80). There were no significant differences between the age groups in their ratings of 
inconsistent speakers or consistently negative speakers, ps > .23.  
Speaker “Weirdness” Ratings  
To examine whether age and speaker type (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) influenced 
children‟s judgments of whether a speaker had said anything weird or tricky, a 2 (Age: 
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preschool- versus school-age) X 2 (Lexical valence: positive, negative) X 2 (Non-verbal valence: 
positive, negative) mixed model ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable was the mean 
of children‟s speaker weirdness ratings for each of the 4 speaker types (see Table 2). Results 
revealed a main effect of age, (F(1, 42) = 10.31, p = .003, p
2
 = .19), which was qualified by a 2-
way interaction between non-verbal valence and lexical valence (F(1, 42) = 48.47, p < .001, p
2
 = 
.54), and a 3-way interaction between age, lexical valence and non-verbal valence, (F(1, 42) = 
15.58, p < .001, p
2
 = .27). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .12. To 
further explore the 3-way interaction, two 2-way interactions (lexical valence X non-verbal 
valence) were conducted (one for each age group). For both age groups, the 2-way interaction 
was significant (preschool-age: F(1, 22) = 6.32, p = .02, p
2
 = .22; school-age: F(1, 20) = 44.74, 
p < .001, p
2
 = .69). As discussed below, paired t-tests (with Bonferroni correction; i.e., .05 / 6 
comparisons, resulting in a p value of .008) were conducted to interpret significant interactions.  
Preschool-age. There was a trend towards children rating inconsistent speakers as more 
weird or tricky than consistent speakers; however, once the Bonferroni correction was applied, 
none of the preschool-age children‟s speaker ratings were significantly different from one 
another, ps > .01.  . 
School-age. School-age children rated both types of inconsistent speakers as more weird or 
tricky than the consistently positive speakers (pos-lex / neg-nv: t(20) = 6.52, p < .001, d = 2.14; 
neg-lex / pos-nv: t(20) = 5.68, p < .001, d = 1.83), as well as the consistently negative speakers: 
(pos-lex / neg-nv: t(20) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 2.14; neg-lex / pos-nv: t(20) = 6.18, p < .001, d = 
1.83); no other comparisons were significant, ps >.21. This indicates that school-age children 
detected the inconsistency in speakers‟ cues.  
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Comparisons between the age groups revealed that, relative to preschool-age children, 
school-age children were more likely to indicate that the inconsistent speakers said something 
weird or tricky (pos-lex / neg-nv: t(42) = 4.16, p < .001, d = 1.26; neg-lex / pos-nv: t(42) = 2.92, 
p = .006, d = .87). There were no significant age group differences in the ratings of the consistent 
speakers, ps > .28
5
.  
Study 2 Discussion 
The goal of Study 2 was to investigate whether children extend their preference for 
consistent speakers to other contexts, such as relying on information about personal preferences. 
I also examined whether children form more globally positive ratings of consistent speakers 
relative to other speakers (e.g., in terms of friendliness and likeability). Across children‟s 
responses, their speaker choices and ratings did not demonstrate a preference for speaker 
consistency. With respect to the speaker choices, children were asked to decide whether to rely 
on information about personal preferences from the speaker or from another individual that they 
had no knowledge about. In contrast to Study 1, neither preschool- nor school-age children chose 
consistent speakers (relative to unknown speakers), more than inconsistent speakers, (with the 
exception of school-age children who preferred consistently positive speakers compared to 
speakers that delivered a negative statement in a positive tone of voice). Moreover, when 
children‟s choices were compared to chance, it was found that school-age children chose 
consistently positive speakers at levels greater than expected by chance, but chose the 
consistently negative and inconsistent speakers at chance. Preschool-age children chose to 
                                                          
5
 Due to the restricted range in children‟s “weirdness” ratings data, non-parametric analyses on each age range were 
conducted using the Friedman test and then Wilcoxon signed-rank test with Bonferroni correction. Results showed 
an identical pattern of results.  
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receive information from consistently negative speakers at less than chance levels and the rest of 
the speakers at chance levels. I hypothesize that children did not show a preference for consistent 
speakers, and did not actively reject inconsistent speakers, because the information they were 
gathering did not require a “correct” answer. Specifically, I assume that school-age children used 
consistency as a cue to speaker credibility in Study 1 because they saw this as a cue to 
determining who would be able to provide clear, good quality information in the future; 
however, when deciding which speakers‟ personal preferences to rely upon, it is not imperative 
to be provided with clear, good quality information because there is no “correct” answer to learn.  
A second goal was to examine whether children form more positive impressions of 
consistent speakers generally. It was found that both age groups rated consistently positive 
speakers as more likeable than all other types of speakers. Similarly, school-age children rated 
consistently positive speakers as friendlier than all other types of speakers. Preschool-age 
children rated speakers as being friendlier when they delivered positive, compared to negative, 
non-verbal cues. These findings demonstrate that children did not perceive consistent speakers to 
be more friendly or likeable than inconsistent speakers (i.e., they did not rate consistently 
negative speakers positively). Instead, children were focused on the valence of speakers‟ affect 
and rated positive speakers more positively than speakers that demonstrated any negativity. It is 
logical that school-age children preferred to rely on information regarding personal preferences 
from consistently positive speakers, given that they rated these speakers as more friendly and 
likeable than the other speakers; that is, I hypothesize that school-age children recognized that 
their personal preferences were likely to be similar to those of speakers that they like. 
Importantly, school-age children solicited information from both consistently negative and 
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consistently positive speakers in Study 1, despite the fact that consistently negative speakers 
were rated as less friendly and less likeable than consistently positive speakers in Study 2. This 
suggests that in Study 1, children were making their decisions based on who they thought was 
going to provide the best quality information and not on the valence of the affect with which the 
speaker delivered information, or on how much they liked the speaker.  
The final goal of Study 2 was to determine when children explicitly detect the 
(in)consistency between lexical and non-verbal cues. Participants were asked to indicate whether 
there was anything „weird‟ about what the speaker said. Preschool-age children only 
demonstrated an emerging sensitivity to the inconsistency, while school-age children indicated 
that the inconsistent, but not the consistent, speakers had said something weird. Thus, by 6 – 7 
years of age, children are explicitly detecting the inconsistent communicative cues. Our finding 
replicates past research (Morton & Trehub, 2001; Rotenberg, et al., 1989) which found that this 
explicit detection occurs beginning at 7 years of age. This finding helps to interpret the findings 
from Study 1. Testing for the ability to detect inconsistency provided an indication of whether 
children were able to integrate lexical and non-verbal cues and manage the cognitive demands of 
simultaneously tracking both of these streams of communication.  Within this interpretation, it is 
likely that preschool-age children were not using consistency as a cue to decide from whom to 
solicit information because they were less able to integrate and detect the inconsistency in 
speakers‟ cues.   
Together, the results from Study 2 indicate that children do not generally prefer 
consistent speakers over inconsistent speakers. Instead, it seems that their preference for 
43 
 
consistent speakers in Study 1 is likely founded in an appreciation that consistent speakers are 
better information sources.  
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Study 3 Introduction 
In Study 1, I established that school-age children apply their sensitivity to inconsistency 
between lexical and non-verbal information to help decide who is a credible source of 
information. That is, they solicit information from inconsistent speakers (versus an unknown 
speaker) less often than consistent speakers. Study 2 demonstrated that by 7 – 8 years of age, 
children indicate that there is something weird about how the inconsistent speakers speak and 
judge these speakers to be less believable than consistent speakers. However, in these studies, 
children were not provided with contextual information that could help speakers‟ inconsistent 
utterances to sound less confusing. Indeed, contextual information might help to clarify why an 
individual may deliver lexical information with an affective valence that is inconsistent with 
their non-verbal cues. For example, on its own, the statement “My bike broke and now I can‟t 
ride it,” said in a positive tone of voice, is an inconsistent message (i.e., most individuals would 
be upset, as opposed to happy, if their bike broke). However, this emotional inconsistency is 
more understandable if an individual knows that the speaker doesn‟t like riding bikes and now 
has an excuse to avoid going biking. In this way, a listener‟s access to key contextual 
information can influence their judgment of this inconsistent message. In this third study, I 
assessed whether children are sensitive to, and use, contextual information when making 
decisions regarding from whom to solicit new information. Specifically, I assessed whether 
children recognize and use instances where it is more appropriate (versus less appropriate) for 
speakers to deliver inconsistent communicative cues and modify their judgments of the speakers 
accordingly. Past research has demonstrated that there are circumstances under which children 
are more likely to rely on speakers if there is a context that explains their prior inaccuracy (e.g., 
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when a speaker has a false belief (Robinson & Nurmsoo, 2009). For example, Nurmsoo and 
Robinson (2009) found that when speakers delivered inaccurate object labels while wearing a 
blind fold (which prevented them from seeing the objects), 3-to 5-year-olds continued to solicit 
information from these speakers at a later time. Thus, it may be the case that children „excuse‟ an 
inconsistent speaker when the context explains the emotional inconsistency, and are 
subsequently likely to solicit information from her. 
 To appreciate the impact of contextual information on a speaker‟s message, children must 
have an awareness of what emotions would be typical for a particular context. Indeed, past work 
has demonstrated that even at 14 months of age, children are more likely to trust speakers whose 
non-verbal cues are consistent, as opposed to inconsistent with the context (Chow et al., 2008). 
Further, 18 month olds demonstrated more checking behaviour (i.e., suggesting confusion) when 
speakers‟ demonstrated emotions were inconsistent with the situation (e.g., distress when a 
positive event occurs; Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 2013).  
 Children must also possess an awareness of the speaker‟s perspective. That is, in addition 
to the child knowing about the context, the child needs to appreciate that the speaker is 
knowledgeable of the context. For example, saying “I‟m going to the fair today,” with a sad tone 
would be more understandable if the speaker knew that the weather was stormy, but potentially 
confusing or suspicious if the speaker did not have access to information regarding the weather 
(e.g., if the curtains were closed); therefore, in this scenario, children would need to be able to 
take the speaker‟s perspective to determine whether her statement is confusing or not.  
 Early in life, children show evidence of the ability to take the perspective of others and 
judge others‟ behaviour and communication accordingly. Infants demonstrate an implicit 
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understanding that others can possess mental states that differ from reality (e.g., Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Further, they understand that an 
individual‟s mental state influences their behaviour. For example, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
found that 15-month-olds were able to predict where an individual would look for a hidden toy 
based on where that individual believed the toy was located (i.e., as opposed to where it was in 
reality). Preschoolers‟ sensitivity to others‟ mental states has also been shown to influence their 
own communicative behaviours (Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2008; O‟Neill, 1996) and 
at 2 years of age, they are able to modify their communications based on an individual‟s 
perspective (i.e., pointing to the location of a hidden toy more when an individual did not, as 
opposed to did, see the toy being hidden; O‟Neill & Topolovec, 2001). In the early school-age 
years, children are able to interpret communications based on a speaker‟s perspective, even when 
this differs from their own perspective (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). For example, Nilsen & Graham 
(2009), found that when provided with ambiguous clues (e.g., “It‟s under the bear”, when there 
was a big bear and a small bear), preschool-age children chose objects that speakers were able to 
see, versus those they were not able to see, suggesting that they use perspective information to 
disambiguate ambiguous messages.  
Being able to attend to the knowledge states of others requires that children override a more 
general social bias, the „curse of knowledge,‟ which refers to individuals‟ general difficulty with 
appreciating the knowledge state of a more naïve other (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007). For 
example, in the aforementioned studies, children had to suppress their own knowledge to 
appreciate others‟ interpretations of the communicative information. This skill has been 
demonstrated in other communicative contexts, such as ambiguity detection and sarcasm 
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interpretation. For example, by 5 years of age, children say that an ambiguous clue would be 
„tricky‟ for the listener when he/she did not, as opposed to did, see where a sticker was hidden – 
even when the child had access to this knowledge in both scenarios (Nilsen & Graham, 2012). 
Further, Nilsen, Glenwright, and Huyder (2011) found that 8- to 10-year-olds recognized that a 
listener required access to specific contextual knowledge to accurately interpret sarcasm, while 
6- to 7-year-olds did not.  
Together these studies demonstrate sophistication on the part of young communicators in 
their ability to interpret language based on interlocutors‟ knowledge of contextual information. 
These perspective taking abilities are particularly impressive given that even adults have been 
shown to be biased by their own knowledge when interpreting the communicative behaviour of 
others (though to a lesser extent than children; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). Given that 
children show evidence of perspective taking skills at a young age, it may be that they are able to 
use these skills when interpreting inconsistent communicative cues from speakers. More 
specifically, it may be that they are able to take others‟ perspectives into account when deciding 
whether the inconsistent communicative cues that they deliver are appropriate (thereby rendering 
a speaker more credible).  
To investigate whether children integrate contextual and perspective information into 
their judgments of speaker credibility, children completed a Contextualized Speaker Task. In this 
task, children were introduced to a speaker, provided with contextual information, and were told 
whether the speaker had access to this contextual information. Children then heard the speaker 
provide a statement that either contained lexical information that was consistent, or inconsistent 
with the non-verbal cues with which it was delivered. Therefore, in certain contexts, a speaker‟s 
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statement was less appropriate, while in others it was more appropriate, depending on the context 
and whether the speaker had access to this contextual information. For example, in the context of 
rainy weather, it would make more sense for a child to be upset about having to play his 
“favourite game, soccer,” if the child was aware, compared to not aware, that it was raining 
outside. As in Study 1, children were then required to decide whether to solicit information from 
the speaker, or from another individual that they had no information about. I predicted that I 
would replicate the results from Study 1, by finding that speakers who used a tone of voice that 
was inconsistent with the affective valence of their words (e.g., sad voice to say something 
positive) would be relied on to a lesser extent than speakers who used a tone that was consistent 
with their words (e.g., happy voice to say something positive). I further hypothesized that in 
contexts that rendered an inconsistent lexical / non-verbal statement to be more appropriate, 
children would „excuse‟ the affective inconsistency as demonstrated by not avoiding soliciting 
information from these speakers. This pattern, however, presumably would only occur when 
speakers were knowledgeable of the contextual information.  
Study 3 Method 
Participants  
 Thirty seven children aged 9- and 10-years-old (19 males, M = 121.57 months, SD = 
5.85) were recruited from the community within a mid-sized North American city. This age 
group was chosen to ensure that most participants were able to explicitly detect the inconsistency 
in the communicative cues (as per findings from Study 2). This number of participants was 
chosen to be similar to the number in each age group in Studies 1 and 2. Two additional children 
were tested, but their data was not included in the analyses due to difficulties with completing 
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the task (e.g., asking off topic questions while the videos were playing or the examiner was 
giving information, being distracted during the task and remarking about wanting to be 
elsewhere). Parents of all included participants reported that their children were fluent in English 
and, as assessed by a standardized measure of receptive vocabulary, all children possessed 
language skills sufficient to understand the statements in the videos and stories.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually by an experimenter in a quiet room within the 
research laboratory. The Contextualized Speaker Task was always administered first, followed 
by a receptive language task. 
Contextualized Speaker Task. The Contextualized Speaker Task was similar to the 
previous speaker tasks, with the following exceptions. First, in contrast to Study 1 and 2 (which 
had four speaker types), there were only two types of speakers: consistently positive speakers 
and inconsistent speakers who delivered positive statements in a negative tone of voice (i.e., 
consistent versus inconsistent). Second, prior to watching the videos, children were provided 
with information about the situational context for the speaker that was either positive or negative 
(i.e., positive versus negative valence) and they were told that the speaker either had access to 
this contextual information or not (i.e., knowledgeable versus unknowledgeable). Thus, the 
design of the study was 2 (speaker type: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (context valence: positive, 
negative) X 2 (speaker knowledge: knowledgeable, unknowledgeable), resulting in 8 different 
trial types, which were administered twice for a total of 16 trials. Each trial depicted a different 
speaker with the type of information each speaker delivered counterbalanced across the 
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participants. All speakers were Caucasian women with brown hair pulled back from their face, 
wearing a t-shirt of a different colour from each other. 
Children were told that their task was to solicit details from different speakers to figure 
out the characteristics of four monsters from a book. To increase motivation for the task, children 
were told that at the end of the task, they would get to see what the monsters really looked like 
and they would receive a sticker for every correctly identified monster characteristic. Children 
were told that this was a real story and were shown the title page of a book to emphasize that 
there was a right and wrong answer regarding each monster characteristic.  
Children completed the task while seated at a table in front of a computer and a book 
with space on the table for pictures to be laid out. Each trial began with children being told 
information about the speaker (while being shown accompanying pictures; Figure 2). Following 
this, children watched the speaker video. The information always followed the same pattern. 
First, the experimenter named the speaker (e.g., “This is Julia”). Then a statement was made that 
described a positive occurrence for the speaker (e.g., “Julia‟s bike just got fixed so she can go 
biking with her family today”). Next, a statement was made that rendered the context either 
positive or negative (e.g., negative: “Her family was planning to go on the really hard route that 
Julia doesn‟t like”). Finally, a statement was made that explained whether the speaker was 
knowledgeable of the contextual information or not (e.g., unknowledgeable: “Julia did not know 
this because she was in the garage when her mom said this, so she did not hear her mom”). 
Children then watched a video of the speaker making a statement about the situation (e.g., “Julia 
said: „My bike got fixed and I can ride it.‟”; See Table 3 for an example for each condition; See 
Appendix B for each of the stories). Then children decided whether they wanted to solicit 
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information about the monster characteristics from that speaker or from a different individual 
that they had no information about.  
To assist children‟s comprehension, each piece of information in the stories was 
accompanied by pictures. That is, a picture of the speaker was placed in front of the participant, 
followed by two images depicting the information read out by the experimenter. The first image 
depicted the statement describing the positive occurrence (e.g., a picture of a fixed bike). The 
second image depicted the contextual information and whether the speaker had access to this 
information (e.g., a picture showed the speaker‟s mother saying “hard route” along with an 
image of a bike going up a large hill). Each scenario involved either the speaker having “heard” 
or “not heard” the contextual information, or “seen” or “not seen” the contextual information. 
Each image displayed the contextual information on the left side of the page, while the right side 
of the page showed whether the speaker had access to this information. When a speaker did not 
have access to the contextual information, there was a squiggly line between the image of the 
contextual information and the image of the speaker; when a speaker did have access to this 
information, there was no line between the two sides. There was also an image of an eye or an 
ear in the top right corner of the page that was either bare (i.e., if the speaker could see or hear) 
or had a “no sign” imposed over top (i.e., if the speaker could not see or hear). Children were 
trained prior to beginning the test trials to recognize and understand what it meant when they saw 
the images depicting that the speaker had access to the contextual information or not. They were 
told what each of the symbols meant and then they were shown images similar to those used in 
the study and asked to explain what they meant. All participants accurately identified the images, 
suggesting that they were able to comprehend the stimuli.  
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Following the speaker statements, children made their speaker choices (e.g., “Do you 
want this girl to help you figure out what the dibdat monster looks like, or another girl?”). Each 
of the 16 pages of the book depicted a picture of the speaker and a picture of a girl the child had 
not met. Each page also had a question about one of the monsters (e.g., How many eyes does the 
dibdat monster have?) as well as two stickers that depicted contradicting responses from the two 
information sources: one from the video-recorded speaker and one from the girl whom children 
had no information about (i.e., each individual was pictured with their response in a speech 
bubble). For example, the speaker was shown to say, “The dibdat monster has 5 eyes,” with a 
sticker showing 5 eyes, while the other individual was shown to say, “The dibdat monster has 3 
eyes,” with a sticker showing 3 eyes. Then the images of the monsters were created based on the 
children‟s choice of speakers, using stickers on a separate page (e.g., if children chose to solicit 
information from the speaker, the sticker with 5 eyes was taken from the booklet and added to 
the image of the monster). Importantly, children did not see the page depicting the speakers‟ or 
the “other” girls‟ responses until they had made their decision regarding from whom to solicit 
information. In this way, I ensured that participants were not basing their responses on their own 
personal preferences of the options.  
Children also completed the stimuli check trials as in Study 1 and 2 to ensure that they 
were able to understand what the individuals were saying and accurately judge the emotions of 
the speaker. Children watched two consistently positive speakers; for one speaker, they were 
asked to repeat what the speaker had said and to decide whether the statement was happy or sad, 
for the other speaker, children were asked how the speaker sounded, happy or sad.  
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Language Task. To ensure all children who participated had a receptive vocabulary 
sufficient to complete the task, receptive vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Individual 
Achievement Test – Third Edition (WIAT-III; Wechsler, 2009) was administered in a 
standardized fashion. This task required children to point to pictures that represented words 
spoken by the experimenter.  
Study 3 Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
All children accurately repeated the content of the statements in the manipulation check 
trials and correctly labeled the valence of the statements, suggesting that they were able to 
comprehend the speakers‟ statements as well as identify the appropriate valence.  
Speaker Choice 
To examine whether speaker type, speaker knowledge and scenario valence influenced 
children‟s speaker preferences, a 2 (Speaker consistency: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 (speaker 
knowledge: knowledgeable, unknowledgeable) X 2 (scenario valence: positive, negative) within-
subject ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable was the means of children‟s speaker 
choices (see Table 4). Results revealed a main effect of speaker consistency, (F(1, 36) = 43.04, p 
< .001, p
2
 = .55), which replicates the findings from Study 1: children solicit information from 
consistent speakers, relative to unknown individuals, to a greater extent than they solicit 
information from inconsistent speakers. However, this main effect was qualified by a 2-way 
interaction between speaker consistency and scenario valence (F(1, 36) = 6.08, p = .013, p
2
 = 
.16), as well as a significant 3-way interaction between consistency, speaker knowledge and 
scenario valence, (F(1, 36) = 12.55, p = .001, p
2
 = .26). No other main effects or interactions 
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were significant, ps > .14. As the main objective of this study was to examine the interplay 
between knowledge and context, the 3-way interaction was explored with two 2-way interactions 
(speaker knowledge X scenario valence; one for each speaker type).  
Consistent Speakers. For the consistent speakers, there was a main effect of scenario 
valence (F(1, 36) = 7.03, p = .01, p
2 = .16), which was qualified by a 2-way interaction (F(1, 36) 
= 5.57, p = .02, p
2
 = .13). The main effect of knowledge was not significant p = .79. Paired t-
tests with Bonferroni correction (i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting in a p value of .008), 
revealed that children were more likely to choose to solicit information from the consistently 
positive speakers (over an unknown speaker) when the speakers were knowledgeable of the 
positive context compared to when they were knowledgeable of the negative context: t(36) = 
3.31, p = .002, d = .73; Put another way, children were more likely to choose a consistent 
speaker when she was aware of contextual information that rendered her positive affect more 
appropriate (i.e., sounding happy about a positive context), as opposed to when the context 
suggested that the speaker „should‟ sound negative (i.e., sounding happy about a negative 
context). There were no other differences between speakers depending on knowledge or context 
ps > .05.  
Inconsistent Speakers. For the inconsistent speakers (i.e., those making a positive 
statement in a negative tone of voice), there was a main effect of knowledge (F(1, 36) = 7.04, p = 
.01, p
2
 = .16, which was qualified by a 2-way interaction (F(1, 36) = 13.92, p = .001, p
2
 = .28). 
The main effect of scenario valence was not significant p = .32. The 2-way interaction was 
explored using comparisons with Bonferroni correction (i.e., .05 / 6 comparisons, resulting in a p 
value of .008). Results showed that children were more likely to solicit information from the 
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inconsistent speakers, over an unknown speaker, when these speakers were knowledgeable of the 
negative context compared to when they were knowledgeable of the positive context: t(36) = 
2.99, p = .005, d = .61. Thus, children judge an inconsistent speaker to be more credible when 
the context in which the inconsistent statements were made helped to explain the inconsistency 
(e.g., sounding sad in a negative context as opposed to a positive context). They also preferred to 
solicit information from inconsistent speakers (over an unknown speaker) to a greater extent 
when these speakers were knowledgeable of the negative context compared to when they were 
unknowledgeable of the negative context t(36) = 4.49, p < .001, d = 1.01. Thus, children were 
tracking the speakers‟ knowledge of the context (which explained the inconsistency) when 
forming judgments of the speakers‟ credibility. There were no other differences between 
speakers, ps > .03
6
.  
Children‟s speaker preferences changed depending on the contextual information provided, 
as well as speakers‟ knowledge of this contextual information. When speakers were 
unknowledgeable, as well as knowledgeable, of a positive context, children chose consistent 
speakers (over unknown speakers), more than inconsistent speakers (unknowledgeable: t(36) = 
4.16, p > .001, d = .94 ; knowledgeable: t(36) = 5.68, p > .001, d = 1.46). Similarly, children 
chose consistent speakers (over unknown speakers) when speakers were unknowledgeable of a 
negative context (t(36) = 5.53, p > .001, d = 1.34); however, there was no difference in children‟s 
preferences when the speaker was knowledgeable of a negative context (p = 1.0). Thus, 
children‟s preference for consistency remained when the context was positive (i.e., congruent 
with the statement) as well as when the speaker was unaware of a negative context; however, 
                                                          
6
 Due to the restricted range in the choice data, non-parametric analyses on each age range were conducted using the 
Friedman test and then Wilcoxon signed-rank test with Bonferroni correction. Results showed an identical pattern. 
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when speakers were aware of a context that helped to explain the affect of the inconsistent 
speaker, children were less likely to avoid soliciting information from the inconsistent speakers.   
Study 3 Discussion  
The goal of Study 3 was to examine whether school-age children take into account 
contextual information when deciding whether to solicit information from speakers who show 
(in)consistency between their affect and words. As predicted, children integrated information 
from multiple sources to make decisions about speaker credibility. Specifically, children chose to 
solicit information from speakers using inconsistent communicative cues (i.e., a positive 
statement in a negative tone of voice) to a greater extent when the context was negative, 
compared to when it was positive, that is, when the context rendered the negative tone of voice 
more appropriate, compared to when it rendered it  less appropriate. For example, children were 
more likely to decide to solicit information from a speaker who said, “I‟m going to play my 
favourite game,” delivered in a negative tone of voice, if it was raining outside (negative 
context), compared to if it was sunny outside (positive context). When looking at children‟s 
speaker choices relative to chance, children actively avoided inconsistent speakers when the 
context rendered the statement less appropriate, but chose inconsistent speakers at chance levels 
when the context rendered it more appropriate. This suggests that children consider the 
inconsistency of a statement against the contextual backdrop when judging the credibility of 
speakers. This finding extends previous research that demonstrates the flexibility with which 
children judge clues to speaker credibility. For example, despite preferring to solicit information 
from knowledgeable speakers, children solicit information from ignorant speakers if there is an 
explanation for their ignorance (i.e., the speaker lacks access to pertinent information; Nurmsoo 
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& Robinson, 2009).  It should be noted, however, that while children in Study 3 were more likely 
to choose inconsistent speakers when the context rendered the statement more appropriate, they 
still did not completely override their preference for consistency, as they were choosing 
inconsistent speakers at chance levels.  Similarly, children demonstrated sensitivity to context 
when deciding whether to solicit information from speakers who delivered consistent 
communicative cues. In particular, they chose the consistent speakers (over unknown speakers) 
more often when the context was positive as opposed to negative. For example, children were 
more likely to solicit information from a speaker who said, “I‟m going to play my favourite 
game,” in a positive tone of voice, if it was sunny outside (positive context) as opposed to if it 
was raining outside (negative context). Such a finding suggests that children expect that a 
speaker‟s tone will be consistent with the context (consistent with Chiarella & Poulin-Dubois, 
2013). Further, while children generally preferred consistent speakers over inconsistent speakers 
when there were similar contexts and speaker knowledge, there was not a significant difference 
in children‟s preferences when the speakers were knowledgeable of negative contextual 
information. In other words, children no longer demonstrated a preference for consistently 
positive speakers (as they did in Study 1) when the positive cues delivered by the speaker were 
not appropriate given the context.  
 Impressively, children also demonstrated sensitivity to speaker perspective by choosing 
to solicit information from speakers who delivered inconsistent communicative cues (over an 
unknown speaker) to a greater extent when the speaker was aware, as opposed to unaware, of the 
negative context (i.e., the context that rendered the negative tone of voice appropriate). Findings 
suggest that children were sensitive to the fact that it would not be appropriate for a speaker to 
58 
 
use a negative tone of voice when they did not know about a negative context - for example, 
saying “I‟m going to play my favourite game” in a negative tone when the speaker was unaware 
that it was pouring rain outside (i.e., due to the blinds being closed).  
Together, the results suggest that children generally appreciate that inconsistent 
affective/communicative cues indicate that a speaker is a poor source of information. However, 
children are flexible in these judgments and show less avoidance of information from these 
speakers when the context renders their statements to be more appropriate (e.g., due to the 
context and knowledge state of the speaker).  
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General Discussion 
A large body of research has determined that children are attuned to a number of speaker 
characteristics when deciding on the credibility of information sources (see Mills, 2013 for a 
review). However, this area of research has given limited attention to children‟s sensitivity to 
how speakers deliver information and whether this influences their judgments of speakers‟ 
credibility (see Birch et al., 2010 for an example). Certainly, to determine whether an individual 
will be a source of good quality information in the future, children must not only be able to 
determine speakers‟ characteristics and knowledge, but also speakers‟ ability to deliver clear, 
unambiguous information. Having multiple channels of communicative expression has the 
potential to create communicative ambiguity as these channels may not always be consistent 
with each other. Past work examining children‟s interpretation of inconsistent messages has 
shown that it is not until the age of 7 or 8 that children can explicitly detect inconsistencies 
between speakers‟ words and emotional display, with implicit appreciation being shown as early 
as 4 years of age (Morton & Trehub, 2001). However, it was unclear whether children use their 
sensitivity to communicative inconsistency to form impressions of the credibility of speakers, 
and if so, at what age. The goal of my dissertation was to assess whether children are attuned to 
emotional inconsistency in lexical and non-verbal cues (i.e., what words are said and how they 
are delivered) when determining whether to solicit information from speakers. I further 
investigated whether children were able to take cue consistency into account against the 
backdrop of contextual information to decide whether a speaker would be a good source of 
information in the future.  
60 
 
In Study 1, school-age children used cue consistency to decide from whom to solicit 
information. More specifically, school-age children demonstrated a preference to solicit 
information from consistently positive, as well as consistently negative, speakers (relative to 
unknown speakers) over both types of inconsistent speakers. This latter finding is important 
given that children have been shown to avoid soliciting information from speakers who display 
negative affect (Landrum et al., 2013; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Thus, school-age children 
show an ability to „override‟ this tendency and take consistency into account. Further, when 
comparing children‟s speaker choices to chance levels, a pattern emerged whereby school-age 
children actively rejected the opportunity to gain information from inconsistent speakers; this 
demonstrates that school-age children were particularly attuned to the inconsistency of speakers‟ 
communicative cues.  
While there was no significant difference between the two consistent speaker types, the 
consistently positive speakers were chosen at greater than chance levels and the consistently 
negative speakers were chosen at chance-levels. Further, the consistently positive speakers were 
rated as more believable than the consistently negative speakers. Thus, it appears that while 
inconsistency in affect cues is an important cue to speaker credibility, the school-age children 
show some evidence of preferring positive speakers. This is consistent with the work of 
Boseovski (2012), which demonstrates that, in general, children favour speakers who provide 
positive information. It would be interesting for future work to determine whether this preference 
for positivity changes through further development; it may be that the preference for positivity 
becomes nonexistent as individuals get older - adults may show a preference for consistency 
regardless of the affective valence of the information provided. However, work on older adults‟ 
61 
 
attention to affective valence suggests that in this population, greater attention is given to 
positive information (relative to younger adults; Carstensen & Mikels, 2005), suggesting that a 
preference for positivity may return (although, it should be noted that this research used different 
stimuli than was used in my dissertation research, that is, positive and negative images as 
opposed to lexical and vocal cues).  
I believe that there are two likely explanations for children‟s sensitivity to cue 
consistency when judging speaker credibility. First, it is possible that children preferred 
consistent speakers, as opposed to inconsistent speakers, because they appreciate that 
inconsistent cues introduce ambiguity into communication. In other words, children recognized 
that an inconsistent speaker would be a poor source of information because she would likely 
provide ambiguous or poor quality information in the future. Indeed, in Study 2, school-age 
children‟s ratings of how weird/tricky speakers sounded were higher for inconsistent speakers 
than they were for consistent speakers, suggesting that children saw these speakers as providing 
poor quality information. Findings suggest that school-age children may be attuned to violations 
of Gricean conversational maxims when determining speaker credibility; in particular the Maxim 
of Manner, in which one tries to be as clear as possible and avoid ambiguity in speech.  Indeed, 
children have previously been shown to demonstrate sensitivity to other Gricean Maxims when 
choosing information sources (Eskritt, Whalen & Lee, 2008).  In addition, this explanation is 
supported by my Master‟s research demonstrating that school-age children use lexical ambiguity 
(i.e., accurate but insufficient information to identify a target) as a cue to speaker credibility 
(Gillis & Nilsen, 2013). 
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A second explanation is that school-age children may have seen inconsistent speakers as 
deceptive. Certainly, it is the case that when individuals are lying, they tend to show a mismatch 
between their communicative cues (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Feldman & White, 1980). 
Children may have assumed that the inconsistency in affective cues indicated that the speaker 
had something to hide. As a result, children may have avoided soliciting information from 
inconsistent speakers because they assumed that these speakers would be more likely to deceive 
them. Children as young as five years of age have been shown to trust information delivered by 
speakers identified as honest more than information delivered by speakers identified as dishonest 
(Li, Heyman, Xu & Lee, 2014). Indeed in Study 1, school-age children‟s ratings of speakers‟ 
believability were higher for consistent speakers than they were for inconsistent speakers, 
suggesting that children saw the inconsistency as a marker of deception. In addition, Rotenberg 
and colleagues (1989) found that school-age children predict that truth tellers will display 
consistent lexical / non-verbal cues, while liars will display inconsistent lexical / non-verbal 
cues.  
Of course, these two explanations are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that 
children judged inconsistent speakers to both be deceptive and to provide poor quality, 
ambiguous information. Future research would be required to determine whether one, or both, of 
these judgments directly impact children‟s speaker choices.  
Importantly, it does not appear that the school-age children‟s use of consistency as a cue 
to speaker credibility was driven by a globally positive view of these speakers. In particular, 
school-age children did not rate the consistently negative speakers as being more friendly or 
likeable than the inconsistent speakers (Study 2). Thus, when deciding on a speaker‟s 
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characteristics, children seem to be able to discern between attributes that are important to 
information acquisition (e.g., clarity of speech) relative to those that are not (e.g., likeability). 
Moreover, their choices of speakers across the first two studies suggest that they apply the 
consistency principle primarily in contexts where the goal is to acquire accurate information. 
More specifically, when children had the opportunity to use the personal preferences of a speaker 
to help them choose a sticker to keep (i.e., Study 2), consistency did not play an important role in 
children‟s speaker choices and children no longer actively rejected inconsistent speakers These 
results lend further support to my hypothesis that school-age children in Study 1 solicited 
information from consistent speakers (relative to unknown speakers) more than they solicited 
information from inconsistent speakers, because they inferred that inconsistent speakers would 
provide poor quality information. That is, when a correct answer is required, it is important to 
receive clear/trustworthy information in order to accurately determine the appropriate response; 
in contrast, when receiving information regarding personal preferences, there is not the same 
requirement to acquire clear information because there is no distinction between correct and 
incorrect information. Indeed, in the case of soliciting personal preferences, it may be more 
important to consider the likeability of the speaker.  We found some evidence for this as school-
age children rated consistently positive speakers as more friendly and likeable, and preferred 
their personal preferences at greater than chance.   
In contrast to the performance of school-age children, preschoolers were not found to use 
a consistency principle to infer speaker credibility. In Study 1, all speakers, except the 
consistently positive speakers, were chosen by preschoolers at less than chance levels and did not 
differ from each other. The preschool-age children were at the age where they would be starting 
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to explicitly recognize that individuals can have feelings that are different from those being 
displayed (as per the real-apparent emotion task, which children pass at around 5-years-old; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). However, it did not appear that they recognized the inconsistency in 
affective cues in Study 1. Study 2 confirmed that they had difficulty with explicitly detecting the 
inconsistency as they only demonstrated an emerging sensitivity to the inconsistency.  This is 
consistent with previous work demonstrating that explicit recognition of inconsistency between 
lexical/non-verbal information does not begin until around 7 years of age (Morton & Trehub, 
2001; Rotenberg et al. 1989). This difficulty with detecting inconsistency likely accounts for the 
preschool-age children‟s speaker choices. Indeed, it is likely that until children are able to 
integrate information from both lexical and non-verbal channels and comprehend the 
inconsistency, they will not be able to use it as a cue to speaker credibility.  Instead of relying on 
the consistency principle, preschoolers seemed to avoid any type of negative information, non-
verbal or lexical. Indeed, their choices, and ratings, of consistently negative speakers did not 
differ from the two inconsistent speaker types. This response pattern, which demonstrates 
younger children‟s awareness of negativity and subsequent avoidance of this type of information, 
is reflective of a more general negativity bias (Vaish et al., 2008).  It also extends previous work 
demonstrating that children are less likely to trust speakers who provide negative attributions 
(Boseoviski, 2012).  
Study1 showed that, by school-age, children are sensitive to the (in)consistency in a 
speaker‟s cues and tend to reject opportunities to acquire information from speakers who show a 
mismatch between the emotional valance of what they say and how they say it. Study 2 suggests 
that this pattern of speaker preferences is specific to situations where children need to acquire 
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information with a correct answer. However, in these studies children were not provided with 
contextual information. In everyday interactions, communication not only involves speakers and 
their messages, but also the context within which messages are delivered. Therefore, Study 3 
examined whether children integrate information from a number of sources, including cue 
consistency, context, and speaker perspective, when assessing speaker credibility.  
Results from Study 3 extended those from Studies 1 and 2 by demonstrating that children 
were able to take context into account when deciding whether to solicit information from 
speakers. Children were more likely to solicit information from inconsistent speakers when the 
context rendered the affective inconsistency more appropriate (i.e., a positive statement said in a 
negative tone of voice within a negative context). When comparing children‟s choices with 
chance, it is the case that children were actively avoiding inconsistent speakers when the context 
rendered the statement less appropriate, while children were choosing speakers at chance when 
the context rendered the statement more appropriate. Children were also less likely to solicit 
information from consistently positive speakers when the speakers were aware of a negative 
context, compared to when they were aware of a positive context. Therefore, children were less 
likely to trust consistent speakers when they delivered their statements within a context, of which 
they were aware, that rendered their statement less appropriate. When comparing children‟s 
choice with chance, we see that children were actively soliciting information from consistent 
speakers when the context rendered the statement more appropriate, while children were 
choosing speakers at chance when the context rendered the statement less appropriate. Finding 
that children are able to change their judgments of speakers depending on the context extends the 
growing literature demonstrating the flexibility with which children are able to apply the 
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heuristics they use to determine credible sources of information. For example, while children 
typically avoid soliciting information from unknowledgeable speakers, they will solicit 
information from an ignorant speaker if their ignorance is explained by the context (i.e., when 
the speaker is unable to see the information in question; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). In 
addition, while previous research demonstrates that children generally prefer to learn from adults 
over children (Jaswal & Neely, 2006), they instead prefer to learn from children when the topic 
pertains to child interests (e.g., toys; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Further, children have been 
shown to mistrust individuals who deliver lies that serve their own interests, but trust individuals 
that deliver lies that benefit others (Fu, Heyman, Chen, Liu & Lee, 2015). My findings from 
Studies 1 and 2 also illustrate children‟s flexibility in determining credible sources of 
information; that is, school-age children used consistency to decide from whom to solicit 
information when a right answer was required, but not when the information in question 
pertained to personal preferences. Together this body of work demonstrates that children are able 
to judge speakers‟ credibility in a flexible manner by taking information from multiple sources 
into account.  
Further, results from Study 3 demonstrate that children were able to take speakers‟ 
perspectives into account, in addition to the contextual information, to determine speakers‟ 
credibility. More specifically, children were less likely to solicit information from inconsistent 
speakers (i.e., a positive statement said in a negative tone of voice) within a negative context, if 
speakers did not have access to the contextual information. In other words, when speakers were 
unaware of contextual information that would render their inconsistent statement more 
appropriate, children‟s choices suggested that they did not see the speaker as a credible source of 
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information (i.e., presumably because the statement is still not appropriate from the speaker‟s 
perspective). This finding extends previous research investigating children‟s ability to take 
others‟ perspectives in communicative contexts. For instance, past research has shown that 
children are able to take a speaker‟s perspective, which differs from their own, to determine 
which object the speaker is referencing (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). In 
addition, children are able to suppress their own perspective to determine whether an ambiguous 
statement uttered by a speaker is “tricky” for a listener based on this listener‟s perspective 
(Nilsen, Graham, Smith, & Chambers, 2008; Nilsen & Graham, 2012). My results suggest that 
children are able to appreciate speakers‟ communicative behaviour (both lexical and non-lexical) 
with sensitivity to their perspective, but also use this appreciation to decide on speakers‟ 
credibility.  
Together the results provide information on the nuanced communicative cues children 
use as heuristics for determining the credibility of information sources; they further show that 
sensitivity to these cues develops across the preschool- and school- age years. The 
developmental pattern demonstrated in Study 1 suggests that there may be age-related cognitive 
changes that support children‟s ability to detect and use (in)consistency in a speaker‟s 
communication. I hypothesize that a number of executive functions (i.e., higher order cognitive 
processes that allow for the ability to plan and organize information; Diamond, 2006; 
Pennington, 1997; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) supported older children in their detection, and 
use of, inconsistent affective cues when judging the credibility of information sources. Indeed, 
children‟s executive functioning  shows rapid growth in the preschool years (Garon, Bryson, & 
Smith, 2008) with these skills impacting a number of other areas of functioning (Best, Miller & 
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Jones, 2009). First of all, it is reasonable to assume that children relied on their working memory 
when making their judgments about the speakers‟ statements, as they had to hold in mind 
information of two different affect valences from two different communication streams. 
Certainly, verbal memory has been shown to play a role in children‟s emotion recognition ability 
(Buitelaar, Wees, Swaab‐Barneveld, & Gaag, 1999). It is likely that working memory would 
have been required to hold information from multiple sources in mind (e.g., the affective valence 
of different cues) and to integrate this information before making a decision regarding speaker 
credibility. It is also likely that working memory helped children to keep their goal in mind (e.g., 
getting a right answer; determining a speaker‟s personal preference), while deciding what type of 
information would be relevant to help them determine speakers‟ credibility.  
It is also possible that another executive function, cognitive flexibility, played an 
important role in children‟s ability to detect the inconsistency in speakers‟ statements. For 
example, previous research has discussed the importance of cognitive flexibility for recognizing 
the multiple properties of an object (e.g., colour and shape) and for switching between 
considering these different properties (e.g., Smidts, Jacobs & Anderson, 2004); Children seem to 
use this skill in communicative contexts, for example, to detect whether particular referential 
descriptions are ambiguous based on the context (Gillis & Nilsen, 2014). It may be that cognitive 
flexibility allowed children to notice the different aspects of speakers‟ statements (e.g., lexical 
and non-verbal) and to shift focus between these to determine whether they were congruent or 
not (both to each other and to the context).  
Finally, inhibitory control may have allowed children to integrate their judgments of a 
speaker‟s (in)consistent cues with information regarding the speaker‟s perspective (in Study 3). 
That is, in order for the children to appreciate the perspective of the speaker, they were required 
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to inhibit their own knowledge (as children were always aware of the context in this study). 
Indeed, inhibition has been hypothesized to play a role in individuals‟ ability to override the 
„curse of knowledge‟ (Birch & Bloom, 2004) and past work has found that children with more 
proficient inhibitory control skills were more able to suppress their own knowledge in order to 
appreciate the perspective of a speaker (Nilsen & Graham, 2009).  
 It would be interesting for future research to investigate the importance of these 
executive functions in children‟s decisions regarding speaker credibility. Indeed, the speaker 
credibility literature has tended to neglect the consideration of individual differences in 
children‟s ability to determine credible sources of information. This being said, some research 
has demonstrated that individual differences in social cognitive skills are associated with 
children‟s ability to take information regarding speakers‟ past (in)accuracy into account when 
evaluating their credibility. For example, Fusaro & Harris (2008) found that children who passed 
a false belief task were more likely to endorse previously reliable speakers. Further, Vanderbilt, 
Liu and Heyman (2011) found that children‟s selective trust of “helpers” compared to “trickers” 
was related to their ability to make inferences about mental states. It would be interesting to tease 
apart which skills are important for which aspects of specific tasks; that is, certain skills, such as 
working memory, may be important for all speaker credibility tasks, due to the importance of 
keeping relevant information in mind. However, a skill such as cognitive flexibility may only be 
important when children are confronted with inconsistent cues.  
This research suggests that, by the age of 6, children are explicitly aware of affective 
inconsistency in communication and use this as a cue to selectively learn from others. It is 
interesting to consider how exposure to inconsistent affective cues may influence children within 
a broader context of interpersonal interactions. Certainly, children are presented with 
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inconsistency in individuals‟ affective cues in various contexts (e.g., when they mask their 
emotions). For example, parents may deliver inconsistent cues when trying to discipline their 
children (e.g., when finding an inappropriate behaviour, like swearing, to be amusing). Regular 
exposure to inconsistency between a parent‟s words and affective display may have a negative 
impact on children‟s behaviour. Indeed, it is worth noting that some researchers have concluded 
that individuals who are regularly exposed to inconsistent affective cues from family members 
(albeit messages that differ from what is being tested here) may be at risk for developing 
emotional and behavioural difficulties (e.g., Mehrabian & Weiner, 1967; Bugental, Love, 
Kaswan & April, 1979). Thus, it seems that being on the receiving end of messages containing 
conflicting affective cues may be problematic for children. However, my results suggest that 
when there is sufficient contextual information to understand the inconsistency, older children 
are able to make sense of it. More specifically, 9 – 10 year old children trusted inconsistent 
speakers more when the contextual information explained, as opposed to did not explain, the 
inconsistency. This finding indicates that it may not be problematic to expose older children to 
inconsistency, as long as they are provided with explanatory contextual information (i.e., as long 
as the inconsistent statement „makes sense‟ given the context); however, it should be noted that 
children may be impacted negatively by inconsistent messages before they are old enough to 
consider contextual information. That being said, it may be through trying to make sense of 
speakers‟ inconsistent cues that children learn to appreciate the role of context and perspective 
when interpreting speakers‟ communicative behaviour. Indeed, it is likely that children are left 
with confusion regarding the speakers‟ intentions when there is no contextual information to 
assist with interpretation.  
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Further, while being skeptical of individuals who display inconsistent cues may be 
adaptive for children‟s knowledge acquisition, in our language system there are a number of 
ways in which inconsistency is intentionally exploited to achieve specific communicative goals. 
For example, figurative language, such as sarcasm, relies heavily on a mismatch between the 
words uttered and the affect with which the words are delivered (e.g., saying „I really hated that‟ 
after completely finishing one‟s plate of food). Given that children are exposed to sarcasm in 
their everyday lives, it would be important to consider that children may need to be exposed to 
sarcasm by individuals they trust in order to learn how to interpret it appropriately. Indeed, some 
evidence indicates that children‟s comprehension of verbal irony is related to their parents‟ use 
of sarcasm (Pexman, Glenwright, James & Drol, 2005); suggesting that there may in fact be 
benefits to exposing children to inconsistent communicative cues. It would be interesting to 
further investigate the benefits and drawbacks of exposing children to inconsistent messages and 
whether there are differential effects depending on the type of inconsistency.  
It is important to consider some of the limitations of this research. First of all, my 
methodology, which involved having children choose between a speaker and an unknown 
individual, differed from the typical speaker credibility methodology (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 
2005; Scofield & Behrend, 2008). In most of the previous literature, children are exposed to two 
speakers and subsequently asked to choose between them. This difference in methodology was 
deliberate and had two main purposes: first, to make the study more ecologically valid, and 
second, to reduce the working memory demands of the task. However, by using an unknown 
speaker as a comparison, there is less information to indicate what children‟s choices are 
compared against; that is, some children may envision an unknown speaker as being 
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knowledgeable, while other children may envision an unknown speaker as being 
unknowledgeable. This being said, studies that have used methodologies where children judge 
only one speaker have shown similar results to studies where children judge two speakers (i.e., 
Birch et al., 2010; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Nurmsoo & Robinson; 2009), suggesting that 
this change would not have reduced the ability to demonstrate an effect.  
There are further limitations in a few aspects of my methodology that differ from the way 
children would experience inconsistencies in communicative messages on a daily basis. First of 
all, in my videos, speakers demonstrated exaggerated non-verbal cues. The stimuli were 
designed this way as this was an initial inquiry into this area and the goal was to determine 
whether children were picking up on discrepancies in any way. Interestingly, even with this 
exaggerated style, the preschool-age group demonstrated minimal sensitivity to the inconsistency 
in communicative cues. However, it would be interesting for future research to investigate 
whether similar results are noted when the non-verbal cues are reduced to more subtle levels, and 
further whether similar results are found if live, in-person interactions are used. Relatedly, the 
sentences used in Study 3 were the same across the different conditions. While this was done 
purposefully to maintain consistency across the different conditions, it may have created less 
typical statements/contexts. For example, while it would be „more‟ appropriate for someone to 
say, “I get to play my favourite game, soccer” in a sad voice when the weather was bad, as 
opposed to good, it is still a relatively unnatural statement (i.e., compared to saying, “I have to 
play my favourite game, soccer, in the rain”). Further, in Study 3, the training on knowledge cues 
(i.e., learning that some pictures represented having knowledge, while others represented not 
having knowledge) might have helped children to be more sensitive to knowledge information 
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than they would be in a naturalistic context. Finally, in Study 3, to reduce the complexity and 
number of trials within the study, we did not include consistently negative speakers or 
inconsistent speakers that stated a negative statement in a positive tone of voice. It would be 
interesting for a future study to determine whether the same results are observed when the 
affective valence is different.  
Despite the limitations, there are several strengths to the design of the three studies 
presented. Much of the speaker credibility literature has focused on isolating specific speaker 
characteristics of interest and has not tended to investigate children‟s ability to take information 
from multiple sources into account when determining speakers‟ credibility. In particular, Study 3 
created a context that more closely parallels everyday communication than previous studies 
have. Further, my methodology does not require children to choose between two speakers who 
present conflicting information simultaneously, which I believe to be an improvement as it is 
unlikely that children would be presented with such a situation in everyday life.  
Conclusion 
The complex process by which children determine credible sources of information is 
important to understand. Indeed, gaining insight into how children interpret their communicative 
experiences could eventually provide valuable information regarding effective ways to pass on 
information to children. In turn, this could help children to develop more efficient or effective 
ways to learn from others. Overall, my dissertation demonstrates that school-age children (i.e., 
ages 7 – 8), but not preschool-age children (i.e., ages 4 – 5), take affective cue consistency 
(between lexical and non-verbal information) into account when determining speaker credibility. 
Even more impressively, results indicate that 9 – 10 year olds are capable of thinking flexibly 
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about how information is delivered in conjunction with other communicative and contextual cues 
to decide whether to solicit information from the speaker or not.  
Overall, my findings add to a growing literature that demonstrates the variety of cues that 
children use when determining credible sources of information. More specifically, my research 
demonstrates that cues to speaker credibility extend beyond speaker characteristics and 
knowledge to the manner in which information is delivered and the context in which it is 
delivered (Birch et al., 2010; Chow et al., 2008). Further, while a lot of the speaker credibility 
research has focused on the preschool-age (see Mills, 2013), my results indicate that children are 
developing sensitivity to nuanced communicative cues into the school-age years. My results also 
demonstrate that children‟s decision-making process, when determining credible sources of 
information, is much more complex than previous studies have been able to show (i.e., 
integrating cue consistency, context and speaker perspective).  Together, my research suggests 
that children‟s judgment of speakers‟ credibility becomes increasingly sophisticated as their 
sensitivity to speakers‟ communicative cues increases, along with their ability to integrate 
information from multiple sources.   
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Table 1 
Children’s Speaker Choices and Speaker Ratings in the Speaker Affect Task and Speaker Feelings Rating Task Study 1 
 
 Speaker Choice 
 
Proportion of speaker choices (SD) 
Speaker Belief Ratings 
 
Mean speaker ratings 1 – 4 (SD) 
 
Speaker Feeling Ratings 
 
Mean speaker ratings 1 – 3 (SD) 
 
Preschool-age 
   
 
School-age 
 
Preschool-age 
 
School-age 
 
Preschool-age 
 
School-age 
Consistent Speakers       
 
Positive lexical/ 
Positive non-verbal  
 
 
.57 (.38) 
 
.69 (.25) 
  
3.49 (.57) 
 
3.44 (.53) 
  
3.00 (.00) 
 
2.97 (.10) 
Negative lexical/ 
Negative non-verbal  
 
.27 (.28) .56 (.30) 2.28 (1.18) 3.02 (.65) 1.15 (.20) 1.06 (.22) 
Inconsistent Speakers       
 
Negative lexical/ 
Positive non-verbal  
 
 
.30 (.39) 
 
.11 (.19) 
 
2.40 (.80) 
 
1.45 (.47) 
 
2.45 (.64) 
 
2.27 (.75) 
Positive lexical/ 
Negative non-verbal  
 
.24 (.25) .15 (.22) 2.37 (.86)     1.59 (.76)       1.74 (.73) 1.77 (.79) 
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Table 2 
Children’s Speaker Choices and Speaker Ratings Study 2 
 
 Speaker Choice 
 
 
Proportion of speaker 
choices (SD) 
Speaker Liking Ratings 
 
 
Mean speaker ratings  
1 – 4 (SD) 
 
Speaker Friendliness 
Ratings 
 
Mean speaker ratings  
1 – 4 (SD) 
Speaker Weirdness 
Ratings  
 
Mean speaker ratings  
0 – 1 (SD) 
 
 
Preschool 
   
 
School 
 
Preschool 
 
School 
 
Preschool 
 
School 
 
Preschool 
 
School  
 
Consistent Speakers 
 
        
Positive lexical/  
Positive non-verbal  
 
.51 (.26) .71 (.30)  3.23 (.80) 3.48 (.49)  3.23 (.81) 3.73 (.36) .06 (.13) .03 (.10) 
Negative-lexical/  
Negative non-verbal  
 
.33 (.30) .46 (.31) 2.57 (1.00) 2.63 (.46) 2.72 (1.08) 2.94 (.70) .07 (.14) .03 (.10) 
Inconsistent Speakers 
 
        
Negative-lexical/  
Positive non-verbal  
 
.57 (.29) .43 (.41) 2.75 (.88) 2.63 (.68) 3.17 (.92) 2.97 (.79) .26 (.35) .60 (.43) 
Positive-lexical/  
Negative-non-verbal  
 
.55 (.33) .37 (.31) 2.60 (1.01)     2.40 (.67)       2.75 (1.04) 2.70 (.65) .20 (.33)  .67 (.41) 
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Table 3 
Example of Conditions for Study 3 
Comparisons Consistent  
(positive lexical / positive 
non-verbal) 
Inconsistent  
(positive lexical / negative 
non-verbal) 
Knowledgeable of:   
 Negative context:  
 (being given a type of candy 
 she doesn‟t like) 
 
My friend will share her 
candy with me /  
My friend will share her candy 
with me /  
 Positive context: 
 (being given a type of candy 
 she does like)  
My friend will share her 
candy with me /   
My friend will share her candy 
with me /   
Unknowledgeable of:   
 Negative context:  
 (being given a type of candy 
 she doesn‟t like) 
 
My friend will share her 
candy with me /  
My friend will share her candy 
with me /  
 Positive context:  
 (being given a type of candy 
 she does like) 
My friend will share her 
candy with me /   
My friend will share her candy 
with me /   
 
Note,  = positive non-verbal cues,  = negative non-verbal cues  
89 
 
Table 4 
Mean Proportion of Times Children Chose Speakers (SD) in Study 3 
Comparisons Consistent Inconsistent 
Knowledgeable    
  Negative context  .50 (.42) .50 (.41) 
  Positive context  .78 (.34) .26 (.37) 
Unknowledgeable   
  Negative context  .62 (.42) .16 (.24) 
  Positive context  .62 (.34) .30 (.34) 
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Child 
  
Experimenter 
  
This is Sarah. Her best friend 
said something really nice…. 
    
Inconsistent speaker 
  
    
    
  
  
  
 
Do you want this 
girl to help you 
figure out part 
of the story or 
another girl? 
      
   
 
  
  
  
My best friend said 
something really nice. 
  
    
    
  
Child 
  
Experimenter 
  
This is Sarah. Her best friend 
said something really nice…. 
    
Consistent speaker 
  
    
    
  
  
  
Do you want 
this girl to help 
you figure out 
part of the 
story or 
another girl? 
      
    
  
  
  My best friend said 
something really nice! 
Figure 1. Example of Study 1 Inconsistent (e.g., Positive Lexical / Negative Non-Verbal) and Consistent 
(e.g., Positive Lexical / Positive Non-Verbal) Speaker Trials 
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Figure 2. Example of Study 3 Stimuli Images  
 
“My bike got fixed 
and I can ride it” 
 
 
 
Fun 
route 
 
 
 
“Her family was planning to go on the fun route that 
Julia really likes. Julia knew this because she was 
standing right beside her mom when she said this, so 
she heard her mom clearly. Then Julia said…”  
 
 
 
“This is Julia” 
 
“Julia’s bike just got fixed so she can go biking 
with her family today.”  
 
Knowledgeable / Positive Context 
 
 
 
“Her family was planning to go on the really hard 
route that she doesn’t like. Julia did not know this 
because she was in the garage when her mom said 
this, so she did not hear her mom. Then Julia said…” 
 
 
“This is Julia” 
 
“Julia’s bike just got fixed so she can go biking 
with her family today.”  
 
Unknowledgeable / Negative Context 
 
 
 
   
 
Hard 
route 
 
“My bike got fixed 
and I can ride it” 
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Appendix A 
Study 1 Speaker Statements  
Positive statements  Negative statements  
I just got a brand new computer I just lost my brand new computer 
My best friend said something really nice My best friend said something really mean 
I found my favourite book today  I lost my favourite book today  
My team just won an important game My team just lost an important game  
My friend will share her candy with me My friend won‟t share her candy with me  
I‟m doing lots of fun things today I can‟t do anything fun today  
My bike got fixed and I can ride it My bike broke and now I can‟t ride it  
My friends can watch a movie with me My friends can‟t watch a movie with me  
My brother said he will help me out My brother said he won‟t help me out  
My new video game is working  My new video game will not work  
My cat purred and played with me today  My cat hissed and scratched at me today  
I just got the best present ever I just got the worst present ever 
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Appendix B  
Study 3 stories 
1. “I get to eat vanilla cake now” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Anna. Anna was going to eat a piece of the vanilla cake that her sister was baking. But 
her sister burnt the cake. Anna did not know this because the cake was still in the kitchen, so she 
couldn‟t see it. Then Anna said “I get to eat vanilla cake now”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Anna. Anna was going to eat a piece of the vanilla cake that her sister was baking. But 
her sister burnt the cake. Anna knew this because the cake was on the table in front of her, so she 
could see it clearly. Then Anna said “I get to eat vanilla cake now” 
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Anna. Anna was going to eat a piece of the vanilla cake that her sister was baking. The 
cake looked really delicious. Anna did not know this because the cake was still in the kitchen, so 
she couldn‟t see it. Then Anna said “I get to eat vanilla cake now” 
 
Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Anna. Anna was going to eat a piece of the vanilla cake that her sister was baking. The 
cake looked really delicious. Anna knew this because the cake was on the table in front of her, so 
she could see it clearly. Then Anna said “I get to eat vanilla cake now 
 
 
2. “My brother said he will help me out” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Kim. Kim‟s brother told her he would help her finish her chores this afternoon. But he 
had basketball practice for the whole afternoon. Kim did not know this because the TV was too 
loud when her dad said this, so she did not hear him. Then she said: “My brother said he will 
help me out”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Kim. Kim‟s brother told her he would help her finish her chores this afternoon. But he 
had basketball practice for the whole afternoon. Kim knew this because she was sitting right 
beside her dad when he told her this, so she heard her dad clearly. Then she said: “My brother 
said he will help me out”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
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This is Kim. Kim‟s brother told her he would help her finish her chores this afternoon. Her dad 
thought it was a good idea for her brother to help her out. Kim did not know this because the TV 
was too loud when her dad said this, so she did not hear him. Then she said: “My brother said he 
will help me out”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Kim. Kim‟s brother told her he would help her finish her chores this afternoon. Her dad 
thought it was a good idea for her brother to help her out. Kim knew this because she was sitting 
right beside her dad when he said this, so she heard her dad clearly. Then she said: “My brother 
said he will help me out”  
 
 
3. “My friends can watch a movie with me” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Alison. Alison‟s friends came over to watch a movie with her. Her friends decided to 
watch a scary movie even though Alison doesn‟t like scary movies. Alison did not know this 
because she was in the kitchen when her friends chose the movie, so she did not see which one 
they chose. Then Alison said “My friends can watch a movie with me”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Alison. Alison‟s friends came over to watch a movie with her. Her friends decided to 
watch a scary movie even though Alison doesn‟t like scary movies. Alison knew this because she 
was in the basement with her friends when they chose the movie, so she saw which one they 
chose. Then, Alison said “My friends can watch a movie with me” 
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Alison. Alison‟s friends came over to watch a movie with her. Her friends decided to 
watch Alison‟s favourite scary movie. Alison did not know this because she was in the kitchen 
when her friends chose the movie, so she did not see which one they chose. Then she said “My 
friends can watch a movie with me” 
 
Positive / Knowledgeable 
This is Alison. Alison‟s friends came over to watch a movie with her. Her friends decided to 
watch Alison‟s favourite scary movie. Alison knew this because she was in the basement with 
her friends when they chose the movie, so she saw which one they chose. Then, Alison said “My 
friends can watch a movie with me”  
 
 
4. “My best friend said something really nice” 
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Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Lauren. Lauren‟s best friend said something really nice about Lauren. But her friend was 
just kidding and did not mean the nice thing she had said. Lauren did not know this because the 
teacher started talking when her friend said she was kidding, so Lauren did not hear her. Then 
Lauren said “My best friend said something really nice”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Lauren. Lauren‟s best friend said something really nice about Lauren. But her friend was 
just kidding and did not mean the nice thing she had said. Lauren knew this because her friend 
said she was kidding in a strong voice, so Lauren heard her clearly. Then Lauren said “My best 
friend said something really nice” 
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Lauren. Lauren‟s best friend said something really nice about Lauren. Her friend also 
wanted her to go to the park with her after school. Lauren did not know this because the teacher 
started talking when her friend asked her to go to the park, so Lauren did not hear her. Then 
Lauren said “My best friend said something really nice”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Lauren. Lauren‟s best friend said something really nice about 
Lauren. Her friend also wanted her to go to the park with her after school. Lauren knew this 
because her friend asked her to go to the park in a strong voice, so she heard her clearly. Then 
Lauren said “My best friend said something really nice”  
 
 
5. “I’m going to play with my new toy” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Susan. Susan was going to play with her new toy. But her new toy was broken. Susan did 
not know this because her toy was still in the box, so she couldn‟t see it. Then Susan said “I‟m 
going to play with my new toy”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Susan. Susan was going to play with her new toy. But her new toy was broken. Susan 
knew this because she had taken her toy out of the box, so she could see it clearly. Then Susan 
said “I‟m going to play with my new toy” 
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Susan. Susan was going to play with her new toy. Her knew toy looked exactly like it did 
on the box. Susan did not know this because her toy was still in the box, so she couldn‟t see it. 
Then Susan said “I‟m going to play with my new toy”  
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Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Susan. Susan was going to play with her new toy. Her knew toy looked exactly like it did 
on the box. Susan knew this because she had taken her toy out of the box, so she could see it 
clearly. Then Susan said “I‟m going to play with my new toy”  
 
 
6. “My cat purred and played with me today” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Sarah. Sarah was playing with her cat. But she had to give her cat away the next day. 
Sarah did not know this because she was outside when her mom said this, so she did not hear her 
mom. Then Sarah said: “My cat purred and played with me today”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Sarah. Sarah was playing with her cat. But she had to give her cat away the next day. 
Sarah knew this because she was in the living room with her mom when she said this, so she 
heard her mom clearly. Then Sarah said: “My cat purred and played with me today”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Sarah. Sarah was playing with her cat. She was allowed to play with her cat for the rest of 
the afternoon. Sarah did not know this because she was outside when her mom said this, so she 
did not hear her mom. Then Sarah said: “My cat purred and played with me today”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Sarah. Sarah was playing with her cat. She was allowed to 
play with her cat for the rest of the afternoon. Sarah knew this because she was in the living 
room with her mom when she said this, so she heard her mom clearly. Then Sarah said: “My cat 
purred and played with me today”  
 
 
7. “I get to play my favourite game” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Angela. Angela was going to play her favourite game, soccer. But it was pouring rain 
outside. She did not know this because the blinds were closed, so she couldn‟t see outside. Then 
Angela said “I get to play my favourite game” 
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Angela. Angela was going to play her favourite game, soccer. But it was pouring rain 
outside. She knew this because the blinds were wide open, so she could see outside. Then Angela 
said “I get to play my favourite game”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
97 
 
This is Angela. Angela was going to play her favourite game, soccer. It was really nice and 
sunny outside. She did not know this because the blinds were closed, so she couldn‟t see outside. 
Then Angela said “I get to play my favourite game”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Angela. Angela was going to play her favourite game, soccer. 
She knew that it was nice and sunny outside. She knew this because the blinds were wide open, 
so she could see outside. Then Angela said “I get to play my favourite game”  
 
 
8. “I found my favourite book today” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Stephanie. Stephanie found her favourite book under the couch. Her little sister had 
ripped out a bunch of the pages. Stephanie didn‟t know this because the book was in a box, so 
she couldn‟t see it. Then Stephanie said “I found my favourite book today”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Stephanie. Stephanie found her favourite book under the couch. Her little sister had 
ripped out a bunch of the pages. Stephanie knew this because the book was open, so she could 
see it clearly. Then Stephanie said “I found my favourite book today”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Stephanie. Stephanie found her favourite book under the couch. The book was still in 
really good shape. Stephanie didn‟t know this because the book was in a box, so she couldn‟t see 
it. Then Stephanie said “I found my favourite book today”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Stephanie. Stephanie found her favourite book under the couch. The book was still in 
really good shape. Stephanie knew this because the book was open, so she could see it clearly. 
Then Stephanie said “I found my favourite book today”  
 
 
9. “I just got the best present ever” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Amanda. Amanda just got a present from her friend. Her mom decided that she wasn‟t 
allowed to keep the present because it was a pair of rollerblades and she thought they were too 
dangerous. Amanda did not know this because she was listening to loud music when her mom 
said this, so Amanda did not hear her mom. Then she said “I just got the best present ever”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
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This is Amanda. Amanda just got a present from her friend. Her mom decided that she wasn‟t 
allowed to keep the present because it was a pair of rollerblades and she thought they were too 
dangerous. Amanda knew this because her mom said it really loudly, so Amanda heard her mom 
clearly. Then she said “I just got the best present ever”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Amanda. Amanda just got a present from her friend. It was a pair of rollerblades, and her 
mom decided that she could try them out right away. Amanda did not know this because she was 
listening to loud music when her mom said this, so Amanda did not hear her mom.  Then she 
said “I just got the best present ever” 
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Amanda. Amanda just got a present from her friend. It was a 
pair of rollerblades, and her mom decided that she could try them out right away. Amanda knew 
this because her mom said it really loudly, so Amanda heard her mom clearly. Then she said “I 
just got the best present ever”  
 
 
10. “My bike got fixed and I can ride it” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Julia. Julia‟s bike just got fixed so she can go biking with her family today. Her family 
was planning to go on the really hard route that she doesn‟t like. Julia did not know this because 
she was in the garage when her mom said this, so she did not hear her mom. Then Julia said: 
“My bike got fixed and I can ride it”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Julia. Julia‟s bike just got fixed so she can go biking with her family today. Her family 
was planning to go on the really hard route that she doesn‟t like. Julia knew this because she was 
standing right beside her mom when she said this, so she heard her mom clearly. Then she said: 
“My bike got fixed and I can ride it”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Julia. Julia‟s bike just got fixed so she can go biking with her family today. Her family 
was planning to go on the fun route that Julia really likes. Julia did not know this because she 
was in the garage when her mom said this, so she did not hear her mom. Then she said: “My bike 
got fixed and I can ride it” 
 
Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Julia. Julia‟s bike just got fixed so she can go biking with her family today. Her family 
was planning to go on the fun route that Julia really likes. Julia knew this because she was 
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standing right beside her mom when she said this, so she heard her mom clearly. Then she said: 
“My bike got fixed and I can ride it”  
 
 
11. “I just got a brand new computer” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Jane. Jane‟s mom gave her a brand new computer. It was the colour green, which Jane 
really does not like. She did not know this because the computer was wrapped, so she couldn‟t 
see the colour of the computer. Then she said “I just got a brand new computer” 
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Jane. Jane‟s mom gave her a brand new computer. It was the colour green, which Jane 
really does not like. . She knew this because it was unwrapped, so she could see the colour of the 
computer clearly. Then she said “I just got a brand new computer” 
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Jane. Jane‟s mom gave her a brand new computer. It was Jane‟s favourite colour green. 
She did not know this because the computer was wrapped, so she couldn‟t see the colour of the 
computer. Then she said “I just got a brand new computer” 
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Jane. Jane‟s mom gave her a brand new computer. It was 
Jane‟s favourite colour green. She knew this because it was unwrapped. So she could see the 
colour of the computer clearly. Then she said “I just got a brand new computer”  
 
 
12. “I’m going to eat my special treat” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Ashley. Ashley had saved a special treat to eat after dinner. But her dad had eaten almost 
all of it. Ashley did not know this because her treat was wrapped in tinfoil, so she couldn‟t see it. 
Then Ashley said “I‟m going to eat my special treat”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Ashley. Ashley had saved a special treat to eat after dinner. But her dad had eaten almost 
all of it. Ashley knew this because her treat was in a clear container, so she could see it clearly. 
Then Ashley said “I‟m going to eat my special treat”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Ashley. Ashley had saved a special treat to eat after dinner. Her treat still looked really 
tasty. Ashley did not know this because her treat was wrapped in tinfoil, so she couldn‟t see it. 
Then Ashley said “I‟m going to eat my special treat”  
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Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Ashley. Ashley had saved a special treat to eat after dinner. Her treat still looked really 
tasty. Ashley knew this because her treat was in a clear container, so she could see it clearly. 
Then Ashley said “I‟m going to eat my special treat”  
 
 
13. “My friend will share her candy with me” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Natalie. Natalie‟s friend told her she would share her candy with her. Her friend only 
gave her green candies, which Natalie doesn‟t like. Natalie did not know this because the candies 
were in a paper bag, so she couldn‟t see them. Then Natalie said “My friend will share her candy 
with me”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Natalie. Natalie‟s friend told her she would share her candy with her. Her friend only 
gave her green candies, which Natalie doesn‟t like. Natalie knew this because the candies were 
in a clear bag, so she could see them clearly. Then Natalie said “My friend will share her candy 
with me”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Natalie. Natalie‟s friend told her she would share her candy with her. Her friend only 
gave her the green candies, which are Natalie‟s favourite. Natalie did not know this because the 
candies were in a paper bag, so she couldn‟t see them. Then Natalie said “My friend will share 
her candy with me”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Natalie. Natalie‟s friend told her she would share her candy 
with her. Her friend only gave her the green candies, which are Natalie‟s favourite. Natalie knew 
this because the candies were in a clear bag, so she could see them clearly. Then Natalie said 
“My friend will share her candy with me”  
 
 
14. “My team just won an important game” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Andrea. Andrea`s team just won an important game. Her coach thought that she had 
played really badly and decided that she wasn‟t allowed to play in the next game. Andrea did not 
know this because the gym was really noisy when her coach said this, so she did not hear him. 
Then Andrea said “My team just won an important game”  
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Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Andrea. Andrea`s team just won an important game. Her coach thought that she had 
played really badly and decided that she wasn‟t allowed to play in the next game. Andrea knew 
this because the gym was really quiet when her coach said this, so she heard him clearly. Then 
Andrea said “My team just won an important game”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Andrea. Andrea`s team just won an important game. Her coach thought that she had 
played really well and he was really proud of her. Andrea did not know this because the gym was 
really noisy when her coach said this, so she did not hear him. Then Andrea said “My team just 
won an important game”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Andrea. Andrea`s team just won an important game. Her 
coach thought that she played really well and he was really proud of her. Andrea knew this 
because the gym was really quiet when her coach said this, so she heard him clearly. Then 
Andrea said “My team just won an important game”  
 
 
15. “My new video game is working” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Kate. Kate got her new video game working for the first time. But her mom decided that 
she had to do homework and wasn‟t allowed to play her game tonight. Kate did not know this 
because she was in the basement when her mom said this, so she did not hear her mom. Then 
Kate said: “my new video game is working”  
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Kate. Kate got her new video game working for the first time. But her mom decided that 
she had to do homework and wasn‟t allowed to play her game tonight. Kate knew this because 
she was standing right in front of her mom when she said this, So Kate heard her mom clearly. 
Then Kate said: “my new video game is working”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Kate. Kate got her new video game working for the first time. Her mom decided that she 
was allowed to play the game for the rest of the day. Kate did not know this because she was in 
the basement when her mom said this, so she did not hear her mom. Then Kate said: “my new 
video game is working”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable This is Kate. Kate got her new video game working for the first time. 
Her mom decided that she was allowed to play the game for the rest of the day. Kate knew this 
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because she was standing right in front of her mom when she said this, So Kate heard her mom 
clearly. Then Kate said: “my new video game is working”  
 
 
16. “I’m doing lots of fun things today” 
 
Negative / Unknowledgeable  
This is Jennifer. Jennifer‟s dad told her that they were going to do a lot of fun things today. But 
her dad was planning to do a bunch of chores with her. Jennifer did not know this because her 
dad was holding the list of activities they were going to do, so she couldn‟t see the list. Then 
jennifer said: “I‟m doing lots of fun things today” 
 
Negative / Knowledgeable  
This is Jennifer. Jennifer‟s dad told her that they were going to do a lot of fun things today. But 
her dad was planning to do a bunch of chores with her. Jennifer knew this because her dad left 
the list of activities they were going to do on the counter, so she could see it clearly. Then she 
said: “I‟m doing lots of fun things today”  
 
Positive / Unknowledgeable  
This is Jennifer. Jennifer‟s dad told her that they were going to do a lot of fun things today. Her 
dad was planning to do activities like going for ice cream together. Jennifer did not know this 
because her dad was holding the list of activities they were going to do, so she couldn‟t see the 
list. Then she said: “I‟m doing lots of fun things today”  
 
Positive / Knowledgeable  
This is Jennifer. Jennifer‟s dad told her that they were going to do a lot of fun things today. Her 
dad was planning to do activities like going for ice cream together. Jennifer knew this because 
her dad left the list of activities they were going to do on the counter, so she could see it clearly. 
Then she said: “I‟m doing lots of fun things today”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
